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Executive Summary 
 
KEY POINTS   
• Contrary to the economic theory of a competitive market and prior studies, processor-retailer margins 
increased when farm level fluid milk prices were stabilized by the Compact. 
• Investigation indicates no transmission of farm level price changes to the retail level in the before compact 
period, creating a serious resource allocation and farm income problem, and invalidating prior studies of the 
Compact's impact that rely upon farm-to-retail price transmission models. 
• Marketing channel firms used Compact implementation to lock in wide margins. 
• A dramatic shift in retail pricing strategy occurs at Compact implementation and subsequently. 
• Brand level analysis corroborates the earlier finding that Garelick and private label retail prices increased more 
than Hood retail prices. 
• Suiza’s rise to dominance in New England fluid milk processing is related to rising Garelick and private label 
prices. 
• Increasing retail concentration and the dominance of Stop & Shop and Hannaford is related to rising retail milk 
prices. 
• Chain level analysis of branded milk sales establishes that Shaws, DeMoulas, Hood, and Guida were price 
mavericks for a short period after Compact implementation. 
• Estimation of market and brand level elasticities documents that the exercise of market power is a source of 
wider margins and higher retail prices in the post-Compact period. 
• In the supermarket channel in New England, estimated loss to consumers due to the Dairy Compact are 19 
million dollars, and consumer loss due to the exercise of market power are 49.4 million dollars. 
• The Dairy Compact increased farm income 128.5 million dollars; but only 51.5 million came from the 
supermarket channel and of that only 19 million dollars came from consumers with the rest coming from the 
Compact’s price support feature. 
• Decomposing retail prices into payments for factors of production and profits documents how meager the 
Compact’s contribution to higher prices is in comparison to the increase in profit by channel firms.  In a before and 
after model centered on Compact Implementation in July 1997 for all New England, retail prices increase 29 cents 
per gallon to $2.78 per gallon.  The Compact accounts for only 4.5 cents of this increase.  Increased profits by 
channel firms accounts for 11 cents.  The remaining 13.5 cents is due to increases in costs other than milk and 
increases in the farm price above the Compact minimum due to fleeting strength in the raw milk market. 
• The exercise of market power by channel firms shifts the industry to a more elastic region of the fluid milk 
market demand curve thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Federal Milk Market Order system and Compacts. 
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Executive Summary 
The Northeast Dairy Compact has established a price floor at $16.94/cwt or $1.46/gallon 
for fluid milk purchases from New England farmers since July 1997.  This Study uses a standard 
“before and after” model to analyze the impact on consumers, farmers, and supermarket channel 
firms.  We use Information Resources Inc. (IRI) brand level scanner data for the four New 
England IRI market areas:  Boston, Providence, Hartford/Springfield, and Northern New 
England.  The before Compact period contains 18 quad weekly observations from February 1996 
through early July 1997.  Before the Compact the Federal Market Order Class I price for fluid 
milk in New England was extremely volatile.  The price processors paid for raw fluid milk 
averaged $1.40 per gallon but, due to the extreme price volatility, it had a high standard 
deviation, .102 (see Table 1 and Appendix Figure F1).  The main purpose of the Dairy Compact 
was to stabilize the farm price and elevate it slightly for the benefit of farmers.  The Dairy 
Compact stabilized price (i.e. standard deviation was reduced to zero) during the 15 quad week 
periods after July 1997 at $1.46/gallon.  This stable price constitutes a 4.3% price increase (6 
cents per gallon) over the average price paid by processors in the before Compact period.   
The economic theory of pricing a processed product when its primary raw input price is 
volatile unequivocally predicts that implementation of the Compact should elevate consumer 
price less than the 6 cents per gallon increase paid by processors to farmers.  Since the Compact 
reduced input price volatility, marketing channel firms face less price risk and the risk 
(insurance) premium that is built into their margins can be reduced.  Conceivably, retail prices 
8could remain stable or even decrease if the reduction in the risk premium is equal to or greater 
than the 4.3% increase in the farm price. 
Empirical studies of asymmetric price behavior also predict that consumer price would be 
unaffected or increase by less than Compact increases of the farm price.  The Compact 
eliminates price drops by establishing a price floor at $1.46/gallon.  Asymmetric pricing studies 
report that market channel firms pass on price increases to consumers but they do not pass on 
price drops.  Therefore, one would expect that the Compact move to eliminate price troughs 
would benefit farmers but not hurt consumers.  Under this scenario the program captures margin 
from processors and retailers. 
Both the risk reduction and asymmetric pricing theories predict that the marketing 
margin, i.e. the retail-farm price spread, will narrow after Compact implementation.  Consumer 
prices will be higher only if the margin reduction is less than the farm price increase.  Contrary 
to economic theory, we find that the marketing margin increased.  Consumer prices went up by 
more than the 6 cents per gallon average price increase that the Compact bestowed upon farmers. 
Retail prices in the 15 periods after the Compact implementation increased on average 18 cents 
per gallon in Boston and 20 cents per gallon in all of New England.   
The primary conclusion of our study is that yet another economic force is at work in the 
New England dairy industry, the exercise of market power by retailers and processors to increase 
their profits.  The Compact served as a focal point for tacitly collusive price conduct by retailers 
and processors.1 Industry trade associations, their paid consultants, and the firms themselves, in 
an extensive and expensive public relations and political lobbying offensive sought to defeat the 
 
1 Tacit collusion or coordination can have the effect of raising prices to non-competitive levels to the detriment of 
consumers, and thus has been criticized by economists (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 347, Levy and Reitzes 1993.)  
Tacit collusion or coordination is a relevant factor to consider in evaluating an acquisition under the antitrust laws 
9Compact.  They repeatedly asserted that any price increase that took effect at the implementation 
of the Compact would be fully passed on to the consumers.  The price paid by processors at 
Compact implementation increased only 6 cents per gallon over the average price paid in the 
prior 18 periods, and price volatility was effectively eliminated.  The consumer price, however, 
increased 18-20 cents per gallon effectively matching the Compact’s 18 cent per gallon increase 
in the fluid milk price over the IRI four week period prior to July 1, 1997.2
This retail price behavior in July 1997 was dramatically different from prior retail price 
conduct.  When farm prices dramatically increased (or decreased) during the before Compact 
period, retail prices hardly budged.  At Compact implementation, market channel firms moved 
jointly behind an 18-20 cent increase in retail prices to lock in the extremely wide marketing 
margins that existed in June 1997.   
We find that the exercise of market power eroded and completely disappeared by the end 
of the 15 periods during which the farm price was pegged at the Compact minimum price, $1.46 
per gallon.  However, when the farm price then spiked above the Compact minimum, marketing 
channel firms reverted to asymmetric retail pricing and again locked in wide margins.  Wide 
margins persist in the industry up to the present time and most of the expanded margin is not due 
to increases in the cost of manufacturing inputs other than raw milk.   
 
(U.S. Dept. Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992, S 2.1).  We do not address the legality, under the antitrust 
laws, of the conduct documented in this report. 
2 Those familiar with Compact implementation may be confused by these statistics because at implementation in 
July 1997 the Compact increased fluid milk prices $3.00/cwt from $13.94 in June to $16.94 /cwt in July.  On a per 
gallon basis this is a 26 cent increase from $1.20 to $1.46 per gallon.  Our IRI data are for four week periods, not 
calendar months. The last before Compact period ends June 22, 1997 so it contains part of May 1997 where the 
FMO Class I price was higher.  Thus in our last before Compact period raw milk price is $1.28/gallon.  Since we 
want to analyze the relationship between farm and retail prices one needs the same time period for both data series.  
We adjusted the raw milk price series to the IRI metric.  The reported results are consistent with the 26 cent 
elevation and a similar impact on retail prices for a monthly data set.  Since we use the average farm price in the 
before Compact period, not the June 1997 farm price, adjustment of the time unit to the IRI metric has no impact on 
our damage estimates. 
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In this report, we document major horizontal mergers, acquisitions and increasing 
horizontal market concentration at the retail and processing level.  This structural shift has 
contributed to market channel firms ability to implement asymmetric pricing in New England 
markets.  But for such increasing concentration and its impact on prices, it appears that the tacit 
price move by the industry at Compact implementation was being eroded by other input cost 
increases and competition by erstwhile mavericks.   
A recent study of the Compact’s impact by Lass et al. comes to a very different 
conclusion than this study.  Their basic economic approach and empirical model, however, are 
seriously flawed.  Since a key question is the impact of farm price changes on consumer prices, 
Lass et al. cut to the chase and estimate a farm-to-retail price transmission model.  However, the 
Lass et al. model is too constrained.  It ignores input price risk and the stabilization objective of 
the Compact.  Lass et al. also use monthly data from 1982 through July 1996 to estimate the 
relationship between farm and retail price, however, the organization and price formation 
processes of the industry changed dramatically during that period.  Changes include an historic 
shift from federal government dominated dairy markets to market driven prices in the late 
1980’s, and several time periods since when cooperative and/or state based over-order pricing 
programs were in place.  Lass et al. make no attempt to control for these structural shifts or to 
discuss whether price conduct varies with the cause of the farm price change.   
Finally, their model forecasts prices in the 12 months prior to Compact implementation 
(July 1996 to June 1997) very poorly.  In fact, when we estimate a farm-to-retail price 
transmission model for the Boston IRI Data, we find absolutely no relationship between farm 
and retail prices during the February 1996 to June 1997 period.  Recall that this is a period when 
11
farm fluid milk prices were extremely volatile.  If the retail price was ever to respond to farm 
price changes, it should have done so then.  It did not. 
Carried to its logical conclusion, the farm-to-retail price transmission empirical model, 
estimated on the most recent data prior to the Compact finds that the Dairy Compact had no 
impact on retail prices.  Our contention, however, is that it is the wrong model.  The IRI retail 
price data are very disaggregate.  With price and quantity data by brand in each of the major 
chains in each of the regions four IRI markets, we analyze individual supermarket chain and 
processor pricing conduct.  Our analysis documents that the region’s dominant supermarket 
chains, Stop & Shop and Hannaford Shop N Save, were price leaders in the industry’s move to 
higher prices and profit margins in response to the Compact.  The retail price data strongly 
suggest but cannot definitely confirm that the region’s dominant processor, Suiza Foods, tacitly 
cooperated with leading retailers, Hannaford and Stop & Shop, by pushing up other retailers’ 
wholesale prices.  To definitively prove this we would need Suiza’s wholesale prices over the 
1996 to 2000 period.  Our market-wide demand curve analysis, however, indicates that 
wholesale price elevation for its Garelick and private label milk would be profitable.  It is very 
unlikely that Suiza allowed the retailers to eat all of its lunch, i.e. capture all of the documented 
increase in channel profits for its Garelick brand milk and the private label milk that it supplies. 
On another point often mentioned in the literature as a benefit to concentration, there is 
no evidence that scale economies at the processor level, if they exist, have been passed forward 
to consumers via lower retail prices. As a consequence of price elevation throughout New 
England, Garelick (Suiza) brand and private label milk (predominantly supplied by Suiza and 
Stop & Shop) clearly lose volume and market share to Hood.  Price elevation and output 
restriction are the primary indicia of the exercise of market power.  Key players in the New 
12
England milk industry appear to be fighting the Compact in the marketplace as well as in public 
and political forums.   
All firms were not equally sanguine in this drive to elevate prices.  Early in the post-
Compact period, the H.P. Hood company, Guida-Seibert Milk Company, Shaws, and DeMoulas 
resisted the price increases and attempted to buck the industry leader’s commitment to locking in 
18-20 cent increases in their marketing margins.  When prices did not revert to lower levels, 
these erstwhile mavericks conceded and moved to the higher price and profit plateau of the 
others.  Estimated market and brand level demand elasticities reported here support this new high 
price, high profit equilibrium.   
To estimate the impact of the Compact and industry pricing conduct on consumers, we 
use a before-after model.  Rather than use the average retail price in the before period, we use a 
linear trend to estimate the retail price immediately prior to Compact implementation.  Since the 
retail price trend is up, using this estimated before-Compact implementation price rather that the 
lower average retail price for the before-Compact period increases the before-Compact price and 
farm-to-retail margin.  This reduces our estimate of damages due to the exercise of market 
power.   
Our estimate of the before-Compact price is forecast into the after-Compact period as 
follows.  We adjust it upward for the 6 cent per gallon Compact increase and increases in 
marketing input prices (labor, electricity, and gasoline).  The model’s after-Compact forecast 
prices are also adjusted up for permissible pass though of the farm price spikes when the Class I 
price moved, for short periods, above the Compact price.  The difference between the actual 
observed retail prices and this forecast retail is the price gap due to the exercise of market power 
by processors and retailers.   
13
In principle, one could estimate the reduction in the risk premium due to the stabilization 
of the farm price by the Compact; however, we have not done so here.  Our model allows 
marketing firms to keep all risk reduction benefits generated by the Compact stabilization of 
milk prices.  In a competitive market channel, risk reduction benefits would be passed forward to 
consumers thereby reducing consumer losses due to the Compact.   
We find that the Compact increased supermarket shoppers’ milk costs in New England 
19 million dollars between July 1997 and July 2000 (approximately 36 months).  The exercise of 
market power by supermarket retailers and processors increased consumer milk costs another 
49.4 million dollars for a total consumer loss of 68.4 million dollars.  Fully 72 percent of the 
consumer loss in supermarkets is due to margin widening conduct by retailers and processors.  
These consumer loss estimates are relative to what consumers paid for milk before the Compact 
was implemented.3
We also examine, on a per gallon basis, the retail price increase that occurred in the after-
Compact period relative to the before-Compact benchmark.  This allows us to determine how 
much the retail price increased and to decompose the retail price increase into amounts due to the 
Compact, the farm price spikes above Compact, non milk input cost increases and increases in 
channel firm profits.  The report contains results for each of the four market areas as well as all 
New England.  Here we discuss only the latter.   
Part of the increase in retail prices is due to increase in the price that processors paid for 
raw milk. In the before-Compact period the raw milk price that processors paid, what we call the 
farm price, averaged $1.40/gallon.  In the after-Compact period the farm price increased to an 
average $1.51/gallon.  Not all of this price increase was due to the Compact.  In July 1997 the 
14
Compact increased the farm price 6 cents per gallon (4.3%) over the before-Compact average 
price ($1.40/gallon).  However, during the after-Compact period there were 10 four-week 
segments where the farm price spiked above the $1.46 Compact price and the Compact had no 
impact (0 cent increase) on the farm price.  Therefore, on average across the entire after-
Compact period, processors paid only 4.5 cents per gallon more for milk because of the 
Compact’s minimum price rule.  The remaining 6.5 cents per gallon increase in the average farm 
price is due to strong raw milk markets. 
Retail milk prices were also affected by increases in processing costs other than raw milk 
and increases in distribution costs.  We estimate that increases in these other costs are 7 cents.  
Thus, the total cost increase for milk marketed in the after-Compact period compared to the 
before-Compact period is 18 cents.  We forecast the retail price to be $2.49 per gallon 
immediately prior to the Compact, and the average price in the after-Compact period increases to 
$2.78/gallon.  Retail prices increase 29 cents per gallon when costs increase only 18 cents per 
gallon.  The difference, 11 cents per gallon, is increased profits due to the exercise of pricing 
power by market channel firms during the after-Compact period.  
Elsewhere the Dairy Compact Commission and others have correctly computed that the 
Compact has generated over 120 million dollars in increased revenue for New England dairy 
farmers prior to July 2000.  We estimate that the Compact increased dairy farm income 128.5 
million dollars in the July 1997 to July 2000 period.  The corresponding number for the 
supermarket distribution channel, which sells approximately 40 percent of all fluid milk, is 51.5 
million dollars.  If supermarket consumers paid only 19 million dollars more due to Compact-
induced higher farm prices that channel firms passed forward, where does the rest come from?  It 
 
3 This study analyzes only the sales of major white milk brands and private label in supermarkets however they 
account for 95 percent of fluid milk sales in supermarkets.  Supermarket major brand and private label sales account 
15
comes from drops in the Class I price below the Compact price that New England farmers 
avoided because of the Compact.  
 What would have happened if the market channel firms had not exercised market power 
against consumers?  In the after Compact period, their profit margin would have been the same 
as in the before Compact period except for the added profits due to risk reduction (Report 
Section II).  Price increases at retail would have covered only increases in raw milk costs and 
other input costs.  Supermarket consumers would have lost only 19 million dollars and farmers 
would continue to receive 51.5 dollars in added income from the channel. For farmers, 32.5 
million dollars (51.5-19.0) of added income from the sale of milk in supermarkets comes from 
the Compact farm price support feature and farm prices below $1.46 per gallon that were 
avoided.  
 To summarize, if market channel firms do not exercise market power, farmers continue to 
benefit from the Compact’s price floor provision and the modest transfer from consumers (6 
cents per gallon when the Compact price floor is in effect).  Processors and retailers keep the 
same profit level as before the Compact plus profits from risk reduction.  With a modicum of 
margin reduction by processors and retailers to reflect the benefits of input-price risk reduction, 
consumer loss would be lower than 19 million. 
The impacts that this study reports, except for the exercise of market power by processors 
and retailers, are consistent with the rationale for the Northeast Dairy Compact.  The exercise of 
market power in the marketing channel has distorted actual market performance to the benefit of 
processors and retailers at an expense to consumers that is far greater than the impact of the 
Compact on consumers.  This suggests that the major policy issue now facing New England 
consumers of fluid milk is not the Northeast Dairy Compact.  It is the exercise of market power 
 
for approximately 40 percent of all fluid milk sold in New England (Figure 11). 
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by the region's leading retailers and milk processor.  There seems to be a clear and important role 
for the Northeast Dairy Compact Commission.  
There is a need to monitor the price and margin performance of the New England milk 
industry.  There is a need to ensure that competition is effective, and that consumer milk prices 
accurately reflect the cost of producing, processing, and distributing milk.  The Commission’s 
work could contribute to future antitrust enforcement or eliminate the need for enforcement if 
firms respond competitively to public scrutiny. 
The need for effective competition is even more critical in the fluid milk industry than 
other food industries.  Increasing concentration and the exercise of market power in the channel 
by processors and retailers is a direct attack on the classified pricing system of the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order system and the Northeast Dairy Compact.  Classified pricing sets a price for 
milk sold to processors of fluid milk (the inelastic product) that is higher than the price for milk 
used in manufacturing (elastic products).  Since the 1930’s, the U.S. Congress and state 
legislatures have used or authorized the use of classified pricing to stabilize and increase dairy 
farm income.  In an effectively competitive milk marketing channel, the inelastic fluid market 
demand curve can only be exploited by government and in a fashion that is deemed in the public 
interest.   
Now with the increase in concentration and dominance in many local processing and 
food retailing markets, private firms are capturing the ability to price off the market demand 
curve. Profit maximizing firms will elevate price until quantity purchased is reduced to the level 
where demand for the product becomes elastic.  As milk channel firms exercise market power to 
elevate prices, inelastic demand becomes more elastic.  As a result, the ability of public agencies 
to increase dairy farm income via classified pricing is reduced.  If milk prices are elevated to the 
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level where market demand is elastic, then public classified pricing programs are completely 
ineffective.  Is this the future path of the U.S. dairy industry? 
18
The Public Interest and Private Economic Power: 
A Case Study of the Northeast Dairy Compact 
 
I. Introduction 
Dairy farming is an integral part of New England history and the classic New England 
landscape.  The Northeast Dairy Compact was established to provide participating states, to date 
the six New England states, the opportunity to slow or possibly stop the disappearance of dairy 
farms due to low and highly volatile milk prices.  Since July 1997 the Dairy Compact 
Commission, which includes consumer and dairy industry representatives as well as farmers, has 
set a minimum price that processors must pay for fluid milk, i.e. milk processed for consumption 
as a beverage.  That price is $16.94 per hundredweight or $1.46 per gallon.  Processors have paid 
this price except for two short supply periods when the federal market order price moved above 
$16.94/cwt and fluid processors paid higher prices for raw milk. 
 The Dairy Compact was vigorously opposed by many groups including the International 
Dairy Foods Association (IDFA), the trade group for the firms that process and distribute fluid 
milk, and the Food Marketing Institute, the trade association for supermarket chains.  Some 
organized consumer groups, most notably the Consumer Federation of America, opposed it 
because they believed that it would elevate consumer prices.  These groups continue to oppose 
the Dairy Compact and actively seek that it not be extended beyond its 2001 sunset date. 
 This report uses Information Resources Inc. (IRI) supermarket scanner data and other 
data to do a study of the supermarket channel.  The supermarket channel is the leading 
distribution channel for fluid milk, accounting for approximately 40 percent of total fluid milk 
sales in New England.  This report evaluates the Dairy Compact's impact, the impact of 
marketing channel firms’ responses to the Compact, and the impact of increasing concentration 
at the processor and retail level on consumers, farmers, and firms in the market channel.  First, it 
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examines the Compact’s impact on prices paid by fluid processors for raw milk and its impact on 
raw milk price volatility experienced by fluid processors as well as farmers. Then we examine 
the response by processors and supermarket retailers by examining how retail prices and the 
marketing margin, the difference between retail and farm level prices, changed after Compact 
implementation.  We find that Compact implementation was a focal point event that facilitated 
tacitly collusive pricing at the retail level.4 Increased horizontal market concentration during the 
period at both the processing and retailing stages of the market channel also contributed to 
noncompetitive retail pricing.  Price enhancement via private economic power has occurred and 
continues in New England milk markets. Finally, we use a before and after Compact damages 
model with controls for increases in non Compact related increases in raw milk and other input 
costs to estimate the impact of the Compact and processor/retailer market power on consumers. 
Our basic conclusion is that leading firms in the supermarket marketing channel have 
used, and continue to use, their dominant market positions to elevate retail milk prices well 
beyond levels justified by the Dairy Compact Commission action.  These higher prices and 
related consumer losses have been erroneously attributed by many observers to the Compact's 
operation and short supply conditions at the farm level.  We estimate that consumer losses in 
supermarkets for all of New England due to the exercise of market power in the marketing 
channel total 49.4 million dollars for the July 1997 through June 2000 period (3 years).  
Consumer losses in supermarkets due to the Compact for all of New England are only 19 million 
dollars.  Thus 72 percent of the price elevation in the supermarket distribution channel is due to 
exercise of market power by processors and retailers.  This estimate controls for increases in 
 
4 Tacit collusion or coordination can have the effect of raising prices to non-competitive levels to the detriment of 
consumers, and thus has been criticized by economists (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 347, Levy and Reitzes 1993).  
Tacit collusion or coordination is a relevant factor to consider in evaluating an acquisition under the antitrust laws 
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non-milk processing, distribution, and marketing costs.  Our finding that 72% of the 68.4 million 
dollars increase in New England consumers milk bill at supermarkets is due to increased profits 
by supermarket retailers and milk processors is a startling conclusion; however, the facts and 
valid economic analysis support it.   
A more general conclusion is that the exercise of private economic power by dominant 
firms in highly concentrated food processing and supermarket retailing markets can thwart public 
policies.  To date, nearly all discussion of agricultural price and income policies have assumed 
that the post farm- gate market channel is competitive.  When it is not, leading firms can 
influence, and in many cases, diminish or possibly defeat government initiatives in the market 
place. 
 
II. Contrary to the Economic Theory of a Competitive Market and Prior Studies, 
Processor-Retailer Margins Increased when Farm Level Fluid Milk Prices were 
Stabilized by the Compact 
 
When establishing the Dairy Compact, Congress and the USDA fully expected that 
reducing input price risk would lower the marketing margin of firms that process, distribute and 
retail milk.  The Final Rule for the Dairy Compact Commission gives the following as a basic 
rationale: 
The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact enables participating States collectively to 
regulate the New England farm price for Class 1 fluid milk, thereby enhancing and 
stabilizing dairy farmer income.  … Other goals are to stabilize processor and retailer 
costs and consumer prices.   
Concomitantly, the findings of Hahn, et al.5 with regard to the variability of milk farm 
prices and asymmetric price transmission are the basis for the theory that an Over-order 
Price Regulation on Class 1 fluid milk which brings about stable farm prices for Class 1 
 
(U.S. Dept. Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992, S 2.1).  This paper does not address the legality, under the 
antitrust laws, of the conduct documented in this report. 
5 Hahn, et al. 1994. Determinants of the Farm-to-Retail Milk Price Spread. Agricultural Information Bulletin #693, 
March. 
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fluid milk will result in price stability—and potential price decreases—in Class 1 milk at 
the retail level for consumers over a period of time.  [Federal Register, 5/30/97, p. 29629] 
 
The basic idea of asymmetric price transmission theory is that retail prices rise when farm 
prices rise, but that retail prices do not drop as much when farm prices fall back to their original 
level.  But for changes in other costs, firms prevent retail prices from dropping through the 
exercise of market power.  Therefore, if the Compact eliminates farm price drops via its 
minimum price rule, it captures margin from the marketing channel firms.  Due to asymmetric 
pricing, consumer prices do not decline if the Compact does not exist, so the Compact does not 
hurt consumers.   
 Congress also recognized that the Compact should reduce the marketing margin for 
another very powerful economic reason.  Appendix H reprints verbatim from the Commission's 
Proposed Rules (Federal Register, April 28, 1997, p. 23049) an excellent discussion of the theory 
and empirical research that analyzes the impact of risk on the marketing margin.  Business firms 
generally are risk averse, e.g. they buy insurance to avoid the sudden costs of adverse events.  
According to economic theory for risk averse firms, when one reduces or eliminates input price 
risk the margin for firms in a competitive market channel unambiguously narrows (Turnovsky, 
1969; Brorsen et al., 1985; Holt, 1993; and Saleh, 1990).  Azzam (1991) demonstrated that this 
also holds when the channel is an oligopoly, i.e. relatively few large firms who are not price 
takers in input and/or output markets operate in the channel.   
 Intuitively, when one reduces or eliminates input price risk firms no longer have a risk 
premium (an "insurance" payment) as part of their cost of doing business.  This lowers costs and 
the marketing margin.  Therefore, when the Compact lowers the variability of the price paid by 
processors for fluid milk, the marketing margin is expected to narrow and offset part or all of the 
Compact’s increase in that price.  When comparing mean (average) monthly retail prices for a 
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time period immediately before the Compact to mean retail prices for a time period immediately 
after Compact implementation, mean retail price should go up less than the Compact's increase 
in the mean farm price for the same time period. 
 To summarize, there are two economic hypotheses that predict the Compact will narrow 
the marketing margin thereby reducing, or possibly offsetting entirely, the farm level price 
increase.  Asymmetric price transmission and input price risk reduction both predict lower 
margins.  In the rest of this section we evaluate the risk reduction hypothesis.  In the following 
section we examine the asymmetric pricing hypothesis.  
 Using Information Resources Inc. (IRI) data, the announced Federal Market Order Class I 
price, and the Northeast Dairy Compact prices, one can analyze the risk reduction hypothesis.  
The IRI Infoscan Scanner data that we use in this report and the underlying IRI markets in New 
England are described in Appendix G.  The New England IRI markets are Boston, 
Hartford/Springfield, Providence, and Northern New England.  Also discussed in Appendix G is 
our decision to focus on the major brands of white fluid milk, which account for more than 95% 
of the volume of white fluid milk in each New England IRI market area.  We construct what we 
will call the "farm price" for fluid milk from the Class I and Compact prices.  For the 18 four-
week periods prior to the implementation of the Compact (the period ending 3/6/96 through the 
period ending 6/22/97) the farm price for fluid is the announced Class I price for Boston.  For 
observations after Compact implementation in July 1997 the farm price is the higher of the Class 
I or Compact prices.6 We compute the marketing margin in the supermarket channel by 
subtracting the farm price for fluid milk from the IRI retail price. 
 
6 Bailey (2000), and Dhar and Cotterill (1999) use the announced cooperative pay price for Class I milk in Boston 
instead of the FMO class 1 price.  This price is the price charged by the Agrimark Cooperative, and it is somewhat 
higher than the Class I price because it includes charges for milk assembly services and balancing performed by the 
cooperative.  A large share of milk, however, is purchased directly from farmers by processors at the Class I price.  
23
To analyze the impact of input price risk on the marketing margin we use the mean 
variance approach first advanced by Friedman and Savage (1948) in a before and after Compact 
model.7 The volatile input price, a random variable, is decomposed into a central tendency, its 
mean value, and volatility as measured by its variance or standard deviation (the square root of 
variance).  One does this for both the before and after Compact periods.  Then we examine the 
impact of the Compact on the mean value and the standard deviation of the farm price and the 
marketing margin (Tables 1a, 1b). 
When the Compact was implemented in July 1997 it raised the farm price 6 cents a gallon 
over its mean (average) price for the 18 preceding "before" Compact observations (Table 1a).  
Given the supply and demand conditions at that time, processors and retailers fully expected that 
this over-order premium price would persist for the near term future.  In fact, the farm price 
remained pegged at $1.46/gallon for the next 15 periods.  Table 1a defines the "after" Compact 
period as these 15 observations from July 1997 through August 1998.8
To evaluate the risk reduction hypothesis, note first in Table 1a, that the standard 
deviation for farm prices was reduced by the Compact from .102 in the before Compact period to 
zero in the after Compact period.  Processors paid on average 6 cents a gallon more for milk, but 
their input price risk was totally eliminated. 
 Turning now to the farm-to-retail milk price spread, i.e. the marketing margin, lets first 
examine the Boston market (Table 1a).  The marketing margin for all milk sold through 
supermarkets in Boston averaged $.98/gallon in the before Compact period, but the elimination 
 
The two series are highly correlated.  The margin widening behavior that we observe in this study was not due to 
Agrimark raising its full service prices.  In fact the cooperatives premium (margin) narrowed after the compact: the 
action and power lies elsewhere in the channel. 
7 For more information on the mean variance approach to decision-making in risky markets see Haley and Schall, 
(1973), any other corporate finance text, or the agricultural economics research cited in this section.. 
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of input price risk did not, as expected, decrease the margin after Compact implementation.  To 
the contrary, it increased 12 cents per gallon to $1.10/gallon.  Thus retail prices increased 18 
cents, 6 cents to cover the increase in average raw milk price and another 12 cents to widen the 
marketing margin, even though input price risk was effectively reduced to zero.  At the same 
time the standard deviation for the all Boston milk marketing margin decreased 80 percent from 
.109 to .021.  Marketing firms clearly used the Compact implementation to elevate and stabilize 
their margins.  Retail prices increased well beyond the level needed to cover increased farm level 
milk prices. 
 To explore who took the lead in this price elevation activity, Table 1a also gives before 
and after Compact marketing margins by brand and by supermarket chain for the Boston market.  
Hood's margin increased only 2 cents per gallon and its after Compact margin was the least 
stable of the three brands.  Clearly Hood was more willing to compete on price.  Garelick/Suiza's 
margin increased 9 cents per gallon and supermarket chain private label milk increased the most, 
13 cents per gallon.  Supermarket private label margin variability also dropped the most.  Its 
standard deviation dropped over 80% from .113, before the Compact, to .019, after the Compact.   
When one decomposes the Boston marketing margin by supermarket chain one finds that 
Stop & Shop milk had the highest margin increase, 15 cents/gallon, and that its higher margin 
was the most stable margin in the after Compact period with a standard deviation of .014.  This is 
an 88% reduction from its before Compact level, .123.  This means that when farm prices went 
up 6 cents per gallon compared to average before Compact prices, Stop & Shop added another 
15 cents, and consumers paid an additional 21 cents per gallon for milk in the post Compact 
period.   
 
8 Appendix K contains farm-to-retail margins for the total post-Compact period (July 1997 through July 2000).  
Here we focus on the first 15 periods post-Compact where the farm price was flat at $1.46 per gallon.  This period 
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Star Markets also increased the marketing margin by 15 cents a gallon and stablilized 
prices at the higher level.  DeMoulas and especially Shaws seem to be somewhat more 
competitive with lower margin increases and more retail price volatility in the after Compact 
period.  Nonetheless the marketing margin on Shaws milk expanded 9 cents/gallon; it expanded 
12 cents per gallon on DeMoulas milk.   
Table 1b gives similar marketing margin statistics for Hartford, Providence, Northern 
New England, and for all New England, the aggregation of the four markets.  The marketing 
margin for all milk sold through supermarkets increased much more in the other three areas than 
it did in Boston.  It increased 16 cents in Hartford and Northern New England and 14 cents in 
Providence.  For all of New England the marketing margin increased 14 cents after Compact 
implementation. 
At the brand level in Table 1b, Hood's margin went up less than other brands in the three 
markets.  For all New England, Hood's margin increased 5 cents whereas Garelick's increased 11 
cents after Compact implementation.  The smaller brands in Table 1b experienced even higher 
margin increases than Hood and Garelick.  Finally, private label margins increased 15 cents in 
Hartford and 14 cents in Providence and Northern New England.  For all New England private 
label margin increased 13 cents. 
Stop & Shop's margin in stores throughout New England increased 17 cents and 
Hannafords increased 19 cents.  When compared to the all New England all milk margin 
increase, 14 cents, this indicates that the two leading firms priced more aggressively than all 
other supermarkets in New England after the Compact.  They clearly were price leaders in the 
market power game. 
 
gives a more robust test of price conduct at Compact implementation in response to farm price stabilization.  
26
For all New England, retail prices tended to increase 20 cents per gallon above the pre 
Compact average price (Table 1b).  When processors and retailers shifted to their new price 
strategy, actual channel marketing margins widened.  As we shall show in the next section this 
occurred because the Compact was implemented at a time of severely depressed farm prices 
when sticky retail prices already had generated very wide marketing margins.  Market channel 
firms response to the Compact locked in those wide margins. 
 We conclude that the impact of input risk reduction on marketing margins, an impact that 
economic theory clearly and unambiguously predicts will offset part or all of the Dairy 
Compact's 6 cents/gallon increase in mean raw milk prices, is being swamped by another 
economic force.  Similar to the ethyl case (Hay, 1999) and as suggested by the focal point 
theorem (Schelling, 1960) the implementation of the Compact, a distinct non-market event with 
considerable signaling of price intentions, seems to have facilitated tacitly collusive pricing by 
processors and retailers.  Firms knew that the farm level price of fluid milk was going to increase 
in July $0.18 per gallon over its June 1997 price due to the implementation of the Dairy 
Compact.9 Moreover both processors and retailers knew that the farm price would remain 
constant at that level into the near term future.  In it's proposed rules the Compact Commission 
wrote on April 28, 1997: 
The price established by this rule will be a certain one; Berthiaume suggests that the 
combined, federal Order and Compact Over-order price will not vary for the six month 
term of its duration.  At least for the short-term duration of this price regulation, the 
 
9 Those familiar with Compact implementation may be confused by these statistics because at implementation in 
July 1997 the Compact increased fluid milk prices $3.00/cwt from $13.94 in June to $16.94 /cwt in July.  On a per 
gallon basis this is a 26 cent increase from $1.20 to $1.46 per gallon.  Our IRI data are for four week periods, not 
calendar months and the last before Compact period ends June 22, 1997, so it contains part of May 1997 where the 
FMO Class I price was higher.  Thus in our last before Compact period raw milk price is $1.28/gallon.  Since we 
want to analyze the relationship between farm and retail prices one needs the same time period for both data series.  
We adjusted the raw milk price series to the IRI metric.  The reported results are consistent with the 26 cent 
elevation and a similar impact on retail prices for a monthly data set.  Since we use the volume weighted average 
farm price in the before Compact period, not the June 1997 farm price, this adjustment of the time unit to the IRI 
metric has no impact on our damage estimates. 
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uncertainty of price variability in the region's Class I market will have been significantly 
reduced if not eliminated.  [Federal Register, 4/28/97, p. 23049] 
 
In the public relations and political battle that surrounded the Compact, industry 
spokesmen asserted that any announced Compact increase would be fully passed on to 
consumers and result in permanently higher milk prices.  The Compact Commission 
acknowledged but dismissed the International Dairy Food Association's paid economic 
consultant's written claim on this point.  The Commission wrote: 
The Commission recognizes that at least one comment suggested that the "impact" of any 
price regulation would be a straight dollar-for-dollar "pass through" from processors to 
consumers resulting higher retail prices.  Alan Rosenfeld, December 19, 1996 at pages 
183 et seq.  The Commission is not persuaded by Rosenfeld's predictions for several 
reasons.  It is, in the Commission's view, contrary to the weight of the comments 
submitted and the prevailing economic literature and anecdotal evidence.  More 
fundamentally, however it is not descriptive and provides no reasoned explanation for the 
conclusion expressed therein.  Nor does it respond in any way to the comprehensive 
literature suggesting precisely the opposite conclusion.  [Federal Register, 4/28/97, p. 
23049]. 
 
In retrospect, Rosenfeld was correct because the market channel firms exercised market power. 
At Compact Implementation in fact many supermarket chains, including Stop & Shop, 
posted signs in their stores attributing all of their retail milk price increase to the Compact.  The 
sign in Stop & Shop stated: 
Due to the increased cost of milk caused by the new "Northeast Compact" authorized by 
the U.S. Congress and signed by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, we have had to 
increase our milk prices.  We hope this poses no inconvenience to anyone. 
[Massachusetts Dept. of Agriculture] 
 
III. Investigation Indicates No Transmission of Farm Level Price Changes to the 
Retail Level in the Before Compact Period, Creating a Serious Resource 
Allocation and Farm Income Problem, and Invalidating Prior Studies of the 
Compact's Impact that Rely Upon Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission Models. 
 
Graphs of retail prices, farm price, and marketing margins over the February 1996 to July 
2000 period reveal a great deal of additional information on milk pricing.  Figure 1 displays the 
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farm price for fluid milk and the all milk retail price for the Boston IRI market.10 The vertical 
line in July 1997 identifies the implementation of the Compact.  In this section we examine the 
relationship between farm and retail prices before the Compact.   
Examination of Figure 1 is startling.  Forget about an asymmetric retail price response to 
farm price moves in the before Compact period.  Visual inspection suggests and statistical 
analysis confirms that there is absolutely no relationship between farm and retail prices.11 Farm 
price fluctuates widely about its $1.40 per gallon average price over the 18 pre-Compact periods, 
but price transmission from farm to retail is virtually non existent. Retail prices march to a 
different drum and increase in a steady fashion throughout the period.  The same result holds for 
Hartford/Springfield, Providence, and Northern New England (See charts A1, B1, and C1 in the 
Appendices.)  Strong farm-to-retail price transmission exists in at least one other milk market.  
Figure 2 for the New York City market reveals that retail prices are very responsive to changes 
in Farm Prices.12 
Another fact is clear when examining the before Compact relationship between farm and 
retail prices in Figure 1.  Retail prices are not being set by marketing firms that are maximizing 
profits or using mark-up pricing in the current period or with a few lagged periods.13 Under both 
of these behavioral models, retail prices would be very responsive to changes in the major input 
price in a fashion that would be clearly visible in Figure 1. 
These are not trivial points for the analysis of the Compact.  Agricultural economists 
have traditionally assumed perfect competition, no risk, and profit maximizing or mark-up 
 
10 Charts for the other market areas are similar and are in the Appendix. 
11 One reviewer questioned whether farm and retail prices would be related if our before period was longer.  Figure 
F1 in Appendix F graphs the Class 1 price commencing with January 1993.  Farm prices clearly are not as volatile 
prior to February 1996, the advent of our sample.  Thus, we conclude that if farm price volatility effects retail prices 
in this market, it would have done so during our before period. 
12 This result may very well be due to the state's maximum markup law.  It states that retail prices on at least one 
brand usually private label, can be no more than twice the FMO Class I raw fluid milk price paid by processors.  
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conduct based on costs in the current period and/or a few lagged periods when they have 
specified farm-to-retail price transmission models (e.g. Hein, 1980; Kinnucan and Forker, 1987).  
Recently, Lass et al. (2000, 2001) used this approach to frame a transmission model to analyze 
the impact of the Compact.  It ignores the risk reduction hypothesis and generally is too 
constrained to capture recent price conduct in New England retail milk markets.  
Lass et al. depart from a standard before and after impact analysis of the Dairy Compact.  
Rather than use all the data prior to Compact implementation to estimate their model, they only 
use monthly data from 1982 up to June 1996.  Then they forecast prices in the 12 months prior to 
the Compact as well as 6 months after the Compact.  As Figure 1 in Appendix E indicates, their 
model does a very poor job of forecasting prices in the 12 months prior to Compact 
implementation.14 
One has to question their extended time series approach for another reason.  It ignores the 
major structural changes that have occurred over the January 1982 to June 1996 period.  Farm 
level milk pricing shifted from a government price support driver to commodity cheese and 
butter market drivers in the late 1980s.  Over-order pricing shifted in and out of the New England 
market (Regional Cooperative Marketing Agency (RCMA) and state supported RCMA eras).  
The structure of New England milk processing shifted in complex ways during the period, 
including the dissolution of the Hood-Agrimark joint venture and steady processor consolidation.  
Supermarket consolidation also occurred in the New England area.  To assert that the farm-retail 
price relationship is immutable over 15 years when major structural changes have occurred is too 
crude to capture recent pricing conduct in this industry. 
 
13 See Cotterill and Putsis, (forthcoming 2001), for tests for markup and/or profit maximizing prices. 
14 This figure is Figure 2 in the Lass et al. study. 
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Finally, and perhaps most important, is the following fact: if the traditional farm-price 
transmission model is applied only to the data immediately prior to the Compact (in our data set 
the 18 before Compact observations) one obtains dramatically different results.  In Table 2, we 
estimate different versions of the Hein mark-up model.  Regressing retail price on the farm price, 
or the farm price plus farm price lagged one and two months, produces a model so weak that the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) adjusted R2 are negative.  Using generalized least squares (GLS) to 
correct for auto-correlation also fails to establish a significant statistical relationship between 
farm and retail prices.  Even when one controls for the prices of other marketing inputs there is 
no significant relationship between farm and retail prices.  The best and only statistically 
significant predictor of retail price in these transmission models is the intercept term, which 
effectively is the average farm price in the before Compact period.  This result is strong support 
for our mean-variance approach. 
The Boston area Consumer Price Index (Table 2, equation 5) does a far better job of 
predicting retail milk prices than does the farm price. It has an adjusted R2 of .711, i.e. variation 
in the CPI explains 71.1 percent of the variation in retail milk prices.  In comparison, variation in 
the farm price (equation 1) explains  –5.8 percent (i.e. none) of the variation in retail prices. A 
time trend variable (Table 2, equation 8) performs slightly better than the CPI with an adjusted 
R2 of .74. 
Since retail prices are not related to farm prices in the before Compact period, the farm-
retail price transmission model predicts that retail prices at and after Compact implementation do 
not increase.  The Compact has no effect on retail prices because no change in farm price has an 
impact on retail prices. Thus, all of the observed retail price elevation is due to changes in the 
conduct of the marketing firms.  In other words, it is due to price increases of other inputs and/or 
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the exercise of market power.  This strong conclusion of no Compact impact on consumers 
contrasts starkly with the Lass et al. results. 
 
SIDE BOX: A DIGRESSION ON THE ABSENCE OF  
FARM-TO-RETAIL PRICE TRANSMISSION 
The absence of farm-to-retail price transmission is not a trivial point in this market or in many 
other agricultural product markets.  A General Accounting Office study confirms poor farm-to-retail price 
transmission was widespread in fluid milk markets during this time period: 
From January 1996 through February 1998, retail fluid milk prices remained constant or 
increased in 27 markets and decreased in 4 markets.  In contrast, farm prices decreased in 27 markets and 
remained constant in 4 markets.  As a result of these price changes, the farm-to-retail price spread 
increased in 27 of the 31 markets over the 26-month period.  [GAO, p. 35] 
The uncoupling of retail prices is also very common in other food marketing channels.15
Unresponsive or perverse retail price movement means that a supply imbalance at the farm level 
exacerbates farm level price volatility.  Consumer purchases don't expand when supply is long and farm 
prices are low; and, they don't contract when supply is short and farm prices are high.  Farmers bear the 
full impact of market price movements to short run equilibrium.   
One of the primary reasons for the shift to the ill-fated Freedom to Farm Policy in the mid 1990's 
was the hypothesis that "free market" agriculture would allow prices to allocate resources more efficiently 
than government price stabilization and production control programs.  This move was also expected to 
enhance farm income.  Yet the Freedom to Farm policy was predicated upon a competitive marketing 
channel and responsive retail prices to help dampen volatile farm prices.  In fact unresponsive or perverse 
retail prices have exacerbated farm price volatility.  This, coupled with farmer’s perennial tendency to 
overproduce and enmesh themselves in the classic over-production trap, has generated an agricultural 
depression that has required more, not less, federal dollars for farm relief since passage of the Freedom to 
Farm Act.  This race to over-production benefits the marketing channel firms that procure raw agricultural 
products at cheap prices.  The out-of-control agricultural economy cost the federal government $28 
billion in 2000 and is destroying the American farmer (Egan 12/24/2000). 
One might proffer that one could “fix” the lack of price transmission in these models by 
suggesting that retail prices are based on a "long run" moving average of farm level prices.  For 
 
15 Hog prices fell 39% from September 1997 to September 1998, but retail pork prices for the same period dropped 
only 1.5% (Tevis, 2000, p. 49).  Also consider navel oranges.  To raise public knowledge of the inflexible retail 
price problem, Western Grocers publishes weekly farm and retail navel oranges prices on its website.  Writing on 
this issue, a Los Angeles Times reporter declares: “It’s been a punishing year for most California orange growers.  
But you’d never know it by checking out the produce aisle.  Although prices paid to farmers for this season’s big 
crop of navel oranges have plunged, supermarket prices in many cases have jumped outpacing even last year when a 
freeze wiped out two-thirds of the crop.  Quality problems and competition from imports have helped drive down 
farm prices for navel oranges to their lowest levels in years, as little as 6 cents a pound according to the Department 
of Agriculture.  Meanwhile, the major Los Angeles-area supermarkets this week were charging 89 cents to 99 cents 
a pound for the fruit.  The retail price for March is averaging $1.01, according to the Western Growers Association, 
a produce trade group” (Fulmer, 2000). 
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example, a 12 month average that smoothes out the monthly farm price cycle of the before 
Compact period might be significantly related to retail prices.  Yet such a long-run market-
smoothing theory does nothing to solve the short-run resource allocation and income variability 
problem, or the persistent long-run tendency to overproduction and low farm prices.  Also, a 
long-run moving average model suggests that marketing firms have market power.  In a 
competitive channel, firms would find it profitable to deviate from the "long-run" retail prices to 
generate retail prices that respond to more immediate changes in farm prices.  Market channels 
that lack short-run price transmission are not competitive.   
One might also suggest that farmers can use the recently established dairy futures 
markets to hedge.  To us, however, this amounts to coping with a problem in the price system 
rather than fixing it.  Also, the future’s contracts are new and imperfect, and hedging is very 
demanding on a dairy farmers ability to forecast future prices.  Dairy farmers in the first instance 
are not commodity analysts.  Historically they have relied upon their cooperatives and public 
policies to create markets wherein they can focus upon what they do best, farm management 
issues related to the production of milk.   
 
IV. Marketing Channel Firms Used Compact Implementation to Lock in Wide Margins  
 
Before developing an alternative to the price transmission approach for impact 
assessment, let us analyze price conduct in New England milk markets in more detail.  If you 
wish to opt out and want to move directly to our impact analysis jump to Section XI.   
Figure 3 confirms that Boston retailers and/or processors locked in historically high 
marketing margins when the Compact was implemented in July 1997.16 Notice that the margin 
for each brand was highest in the before Compact period during the 7 periods preceding the 
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Compact.  As seen in Figure 1 this was due to low farm price.  Margins do not narrow in July 
1997 as one would have expected based upon prior observed price conduct in this market and 
economic theory.  Hood and Garelick margins drift down during the first Compact price peg 
period (July 97 through August 98) but private label remains quite stable.  When farm prices 
spike starting in September 98 and again in September 99, margins temporarily narrow but the 
trend in 1999 and 2000 is clearly up in a very strong fashion.  Also the Hood premium over 
Garelick narrows and disappears by the end of the period.  The margin on these two brands 
relative to private label clearly widens during this period and the underlying private label margin 
also widens.  
 
V. A Dramatic Shift in Retail Pricing Strategy Occurs at Compact Implementation and  
 Subsequently  
Returning to Figure 1, note that just before the implementation of the Dairy Compact the 
spread between the retail and farm price was historically very wide.  In fact, it was wider than at 
any other time during the before Compact period because the farm price was in a deep trough.  
This was the time to put a program such as the Compact into effect.  Farmers clearly needed 
price relief and marketing firms had such fat margins that they could absorb an over-order 
premium without elevating retail prices.  At least this is what reasonable observers would 
conclude after viewing the retail and farm price trends from February 1996 through June 1997 
and the crystal clear lack of a relationship between them.   
Now enters the difference between “could absorb” and “would absorb.”  In July 1997 
retail milk prices in Boston went up 18 cents/gallon in response to the farm price increase of 6 
cents/gallon over the average farm price of the before Compact period.  Marketing firm price 
 
16 Similar charts for the other market areas are in the Appendices A, B, and C. 
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conduct shifted dramatically at the time of Compact implementation.  Before the Compact, retail 
prices moved slowly higher along a very stable linear trend.  Then retail prices jerk to life in lock 
step with the Commission's move. 
After Compact implementation retail prices stabilized at the new higher margin level for 
as long as farm prices remained pegged at the $1.46/gallon level.  When farm prices moved 
above that level in September 1998 and again in September 1999, retail prices again respond to 
the increase.  When farm price fell back to the Compact minimum price of $1.46/gallon, retail 
prices do drop, however they do not drop back to the level observed in the first farm price peg 
period.    Asymmetric retail pricing seems to exist in this market, but ironically only after the 
advent of the Compact.  Since July 1997 consumers experiencing the price increases documented 
in these charts most certainly have received the impression that all retail milk price increases and 
subsequent persistent high prices are due to increased farm prices and nothing else.  
 
VI. Brand Level Analysis Corroborates the Earlier Finding that Garelick and Private 
Label Retail Prices Increased More than Hood Retail Prices 
 
Figure 4 decomposes the Boston all milk retail price series into its three major brand 
level components, Hood, Garelick, and Private Label milk.17 Note that in the before Compact 
period, Hood milk sold at essentially a stable premium to Garelick and private label milk.  The 
price for all brands of milk increase at Compact implementation, but over the ensuring 15 
months the price of Hood milk erodes more than Garelick or Private Label.  As we shall see 
below, Hood’s volume jumps up in this "erosion" period after the Compact (Figure 12).  Therein 
lies the source of the low 2 cent per gallon increase in the before versus after Compact price of 
Hood milk in Table 1a. 
 
17 Similar figures and results for the other 3 markets are available in Appendices A, B, and C. 
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VII. Suiza’s Rise to Dominance in New England Fluid Milk Processing is Related to 
Rising Garelick and Private Label Prices 
 
Note that the gap between Hood and Garelick prices in Figure 4 dramatically narrows in 
1999 and 2000 due to very strong price increases in Garelick milk.  What underpins this 
narrowing of the brand gap?  It may be entirely due to changes in retailer price conduct, not 
processor price conduct. If we knew the wholesale prices for milk, we could definitely determine 
who widened the retail-farm margin, however we do not know them.  Available public 
information and the IRI data nonetheless strongly suggest that Garelick wholesale price increases 
contributed to rising retail prices.  The same is true for private label milk supplied by 
Suiza/Garelick.  
The market structure of milk processing in New England collapsed during this period to a 
single dominant firm, Suiza Foods, with extensive private label processing and Garelick fresh 
milk brand.  In July 1997, co-temporal with Compact implementation, Suiza purchased the 
Garelick Company and entered New England in a major fashion.  In July 1998, it purchased 
another leading New England milk processor, West Lynn Creameries, and in August 1998 it 
purchased yet another leading processor, Cumberland Farms.  Cumberland Farms had a 
reputation for being aggressively competitive when bidding against Suiza/Garelick for private 
label contracts (Healy).18 Thereafter Suiza purchased Natures Best Dairy in Rhode Island and 
attained control of New England Dairies in Hartford, CT through a joint venture with Dairy 
Farmers of America.   
Finally, on June 1, 2000, Suiza/Garelick commenced supplying private label milk as well 
as Garelick brand milk to Stop & Shop.  Prior to that, for the entire period from February 1996, 
 
18 Several independent industry sources corroborate this fact. 
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Stop & Shop processed its own private label milk in addition to processing and distributing the 
Hood milk that it sold in its supermarkets.19 Moreover, Stop & Shop also controlled the 
marketing, including pricing of Hood milk in its stores (Beatty). This means that for Stop & 
Shop there is no question who raised prices on 80 percent of the milk that it sold (Appendix 
Table F3).  Since the company is fully integrated and controls the Hood as well as private label 
lines, Stop & Shop is responsible for higher retail prices on private label and Hood milk.  Suiza 
and/or Stop & Shop are responsible for the higher prices on Garelick milk, which accounts for 
nearly all of the remaining milk sold in Stop & Shop supermarkets (Appendix Table F3). 
Table 3 below gives an estimate of the market shares in all of New England for the 
leading milk processors for the year ending June 30, 2000.  Before the Stop & Shop private label 
contract Suiza/Garelick accounted for 44.8 percent of fluid milk sales to supermarkets.  This is 
more than twice the share of the number two processor, Hood.  Suiza/Garelick is nearly three 
times larger than Hood if one removes the Stop & Shop Hood milk from Hood's share.  After the 
June 2000 closing of the Stop & Shop plant Suiza controls 63.7% (44.8 + 18.9) of the New 
England supermarket channel.  Since Hood’s Stop & Shop volume will undoubtedly drop under 
the new arrangement because Stop & Shop clearly has less incentive to sell Hood milk, this share 
is understated (Baily, 3/24/2000).  We estimate that after the consummation of the Stop & Shop 
deal, Suiza/Garelick will sell more than four times the volume of milk that its nearest competitor, 
Hood, sells in New England.  Suiza/Garelick market share in the smaller Boston IRI market is 
even higher and probably falls in the 80-90 percent range after the Stop & Shop acquisition.  
 
19 This is common knowledge in the New England dairy industry.  Several independent industry sources corroborate 
this fact.  Also, one can use the USDA Health Inspection Service plant numbers that by law are printed on every 
container to identify the processing plant.  Hood milk sold in Stop & Shop had the same plant number as Stop & 
Shop private label during this era.  Today, Stop & Shop and nearly all other private label milk in southern New 
England comes from plant no 35-100, the Suiza plant in Franklin, Massachusetts that also bottles Garelick and 
Sealtest milk. 
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Strictly speaking, these market share estimates are for the supermarket channel, however, 
Suiza/Garelick’s dominance in other channels is most probably similar.  There are very few 
alternative suppliers.  Suiza is unmistakably the dominant milk processor in New England.20 
As Suiza has acquired its market share, it actually closed or caused the closure of several 
very substantial milk plants including the Stop & Shop Readville MA plant, the New England 
Dairies in Newington, CT, and the Cumberland Farms-Massachusetts plant.  Today it operates 
two large plants in southern New England in the Boston IRI market area (Franklin, MA and W. 
Lynn, MA).  Their East Greenbush, NY plant near Albany and two smaller plants in Vermont 
and Maine also supply milk to New England.  As a result of Suiza’s related plant closings, there 
is dramatically less processing capacity in New England and little excess capacity outside of the 
Suiza plant system (Healy).21 
Given this very major increase in processor concentration in the New England market, we 
conclude that the Garelick and private label retail price moves in 1999 and 2000 that widen the 
marketing margin are at least in part due to price leadership by Suiza-Garelick at the processor 
level as well as the exercising of market power by supermarket chains at the retail level.   
The only other explanation for the disappearance of the gap between Hood and the other 
two products is that retailers exclusively controlled the retail prices and priced in a fashion to 
generate a very significant shift in volume away from private label and Garelick to Hood.  We 
find this most implausible.  Manufacturers regularly monitor retailers to ensure “fair” markups of 
their products relative to their competitors.   
 
20 Lest one think that this dominance does not effect conduct.  Industry executives now request anonymity when 
providing information for fear of retaliation by Suiza. 
21 In response to the disappearance of capacity and increased demand for an alternative to Suiza, Guida-Siebert 
Dairy, New Britain, CT has recently expanded capacity.  Plant numbers (see footnote 16) and information from Alex 
Guida, president of Guida-Siebert Dairy indicate that it now supplies BIG Y, a regional chain, with private label 
milk. 
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We also conclude that any scale, capacity utilization, or distribution economies that Suiza 
may have captured with its rise to dominance, have not been passed forward to consumers in the 
form of a lower retail-farm marketing margin and lower retail prices.22 
Finally, based on Hood price trajectories, we conclude that Hood reluctantly followed 
and at times clearly was a price maverick. 
 
VIII. Increasing Retail Concentration and the Dominance of Stop & Shop and Hannaford 
is Related to Rising Retail Milk Prices 
Leading supermarket chains in the four New England markets have also achieved high 
levels of market concentration.  Table 4 gives the all commodity volume (ACV) market shares 
for the leading grocery chains in each IRI market.  Stop & Shop is the leader in the three 
Southern New England markets.  It is a dominant firm in Hartford/Springfield and Providence 
with market shares of 41.8 percent and 47.3 percent respectively.  Hannaford Stop N Save is the 
leader and dominant in Northern New England with a 36.7 percent market share and no close 
competitor.  Market concentration, as measured by the four firm concentration ratio and a partial 
Hirshman-Herfindahl Index is very high and has increased in all four market areas.  Moreover, 
IRI market areas are larger than the relevant retail market areas for antitrust analysis.  
Concentration and the dominance of Stop & Shop and Hannaford in smaller relevant market 
areas is higher than the levels reported in Table 4. 
Returning to the Boston market we have milk sales data for the top four chains.  Figure 5 
displays the sum of the shares of these top four firms, i.e. the four firm seller concentration ratio 
for milk volume measured in gallons.  Since Shaws acquired Star Market in July 1999, this is 
 
22 Suiza has provided no public documentation of economies related to its rise to dominance.  The retail-farm 
marketing margin also widens, as we show below, when one controls for increases in non-farm market input costs. 
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actually a 3 firm concentration ratio after that date.  The combined market share of these chains 
in the Boston market has increased since February 1996 from approximately 75% of supermarket 
milk sales to 85%.  Figure 6 plots the market shares over time for the top 4 firms and all other 
supermarkets. Note that Stop & Shop, the all commodity volume (ACV) market leader in the 
Boston supermarket retailing market, is also the leader in the fluid milk category.  Moreover, its 
share of fluid milk sales in supermarkets has increased since early 1996.  Thus we not only 
observe a major increase in seller concentration at the processor level, we also have increases in 
seller concentration of all grocery products and fluid milk to very high levels at the retail level.   
These structural changes are consistent with the observed price elevation for milk at 
Compact implementation and asymmetric pricing in response to subsequent farm price spikes. 
Recall from Tables 1a and 1b that the dominant firms, Stop & Shop and Hannaford increased 
margins the most during the after Compact period.  Also, see Appendix Figures A2 and B2 for 
evidence of Stop & Shop dominance.  They are routinely able to charge higher prices than other 
supermarkets for milk in Hartford and Providence. 
 
IX. Chain Level Analysis of Branded Milk Sales Establishes that Shaws, DeMoulas 
Hood and Guida were Price Mavericks for a Short Period After Compact 
Implementation 
 
Turning now to the pricing conduct of the top four Boston chains, Figures 7 through 10 
give the price trajectories for Hood, Garelick and private label milk from February 1996 through 
July 2000 for each chain.23 In Figure 7, Stop & Shop prices for all three products jump at 
Compact implementation.  Private label prices (recall private label is bottled by Stop & Shop) 
remain extremely stable at this new level for 15 months until the advent of the first post-Compact 
farm milk price spike.  Garelick brand milk remains stable until May 1998 and price increases 
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commence four months prior to the farm price spike.  Prices for Hood milk, bottled and marketed 
under license from Hood by Stop & Shop, drop in May 1998.   
There seems to be a disagreement between Stop & Shop and Suiza/Garelick as to what 
the price of branded milk should be.  Suiza/Garelick wants it higher and Stop & Shop appears to 
be punishing them for their move by lowering Hood milk price rather than following their lead.  
Hood milk remains very competitively priced, i.e. the traditionally positive brand differential 
between Hood and Garelick is negative from the Fall of 1998 until June 2000.  Suiza clearly was 
pushing Garelick prices and Stop & Shop was resisting with Hood prices.  Appendix Table F3 
details how brand shares in Stop & Shop moved in response to this pricing deal.  Hood gained 
share and Garelick lost share. 
Finally, note in Figure 7 that Stop & Shop prices for all brands follow the same pattern in 
1999 and 2000 as the Boston market level prices (Figures 1 and 4).  Retail prices elevate 
dramatically in response to farm price spikes but do not fully adjust down when farm price 
reverts to the Dairy Compact support level. 
Milk pricing at Shaws Supermarkets is an entirely different story.  Figure 8 chronicles a 
firm that is more squarely focused on price competition and willing to chisel or cheat on the 
price leadership of Stop & Shop at retail and Suiza/Garelick at wholesale.  The primary vehicle 
for their aggressive attempt to lower milk prices during the 15 months after Compact 
implementation was the pricing of Hood milk that was introduced into their chain in April 1997.  
Shaws and Hood aggressively priced Hood milk forcing the Garelick brand price to drop back to 
before Compact levels by December 1997.  Shaws private label milk also makes a distinct run 
immediately towards pre-Compact price levels, but Shaws caved in by January 1998 and 
reverted to the high level consistent with the 18 cent hike at Compact implementation.  Although 
 
23 Similar charts for the other three market areas are in the Appendices A, B, and C. 
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we lack wholesale price data, this move is consistent with the refusal of its private label supplier 
to cut price.  The chain seems to have a lower margin on private label for a few months in an 
attempt to force its suppliers’ price down, but failed, and then reverted to cooperating with the 
leaders, Stop & Shop and Garelick/Suiza.24 In 1999 and 2000, Shaw's price conduct clearly 
mirrors Stop & Shop pricing.  A key question that we cannot answer definitively is who drove 
this reversion, Shaws or its supplier of private label milk, Suiza Foods Inc?25 
Figure 9 gives the price trajectories for Hood, Garelick and private label milk at 
DeMoulas, the other chain that has a predilection for price competition.  Note that Hood prices 
do not change at Compact implementation and trend down to levels below pre-Compact prices 
during the 15 month period after implementation when the farm price was pegged at 
$1.46/gallon.  Garelick prices moved up three months in advance of the Compact and break back 
towards lower prices five months after implementation.  Private label milk, which accounts for 
approximately 80% of DeMoulas sales, registers the 18 cent jump in July 1997.26 DeMoulas, 
however, ceded back part of that price hike beginning in early 1998.  During 1999 and 2000 
DeMoulas general price conduct mirrors Stop & Shop and Shaws with large and asymmetric 
responses to farm price moves.   
Note that DeMoulas prices for all three products are generally lower than Stop & Shop 
prices in the post-Compact period.  Again, a key question is who is driving DeMoulas retail 
 
24 See Cotterill 1999 for a case study of Shaws attempt at price competition on all supermarket products in several 
Connecticut markets during 1997.  The milk price scenario in Connecticut (see Appendix A) is identical to the one 
in Figure 5, and both are congruent with Shaws attempt to compete on price with Stop & Shop across all products in 
1997.  Cotterill (1999) concludes that by 1998 Shaws conceded defeat in Connecticut and reverted to the high price 
regime established by the market leader Stop & Shop. 
25 That Suiza supplied Shaws during this period is confirmed by Gillmeister and industry executives. 
26 See Appendix Table F3 for brand and private label market shares by chain and by market areas for pre and post-
Compact time periods.  Market share shifts corroborate the conclusions on pricing presented in this section. 
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prices?  Is it DeMoulas or the milk processors.27 Hood appears to have a hand in the stability of 
its retail price.   
Figure 10 gives price trends for Boston's old line inner city supermarket chain, Star 
Markets.  Star clearly follows the Stop & Shop and Suiza lead throughout the post-Compact 
period.  Prices for its private label and its Garelick brand milk elevate at Compact 
implementation and remain very stable until the September 1998 farm price spike.28 Hood milk 
price behaves very differently and suggests again, and this time quite clearly, that the Hood 
Company competed on price during 1998.  Star's retail price for Hood does increase in the 
months after Compact implementation; but, it drops to pre-Compact levels in January 1998 and 
remains there until it reacts to the farm price spike in Fall 1998. 
Based on the very different behavior of Hood milk relative to Garelick brand and 
Suiza/Garelick supplied private label in the Shaws, DeMoulas, and Star chains, we conclude as 
we did when analyzing Tables 1a and 1b that Hood did not participate in the tacitly collusive 
price elevation of milk prices at the implementation of the Dairy Compact.  However, Hood 
ultimately followed other’s price leads in 1999 and 2000.  Stop & Shop, as a milk processor and 
the dominant retailer, and Suiza/Garelick as the dominant processor have been the price leaders 
throughout the July 1997 to July 2000 period.  Like Hood, Shaws and DeMoulas attempted 
during the early post-Compact period to chisel on the new tacitly collusive high price regime, but 
failed to break it and thereafter have followed, effectively widening margins with the other 
players. 
Additional evidence for this conclusion comes from two sources.  First the popular press 
has documented a bitter and open marketing and public relations war between Hood and 
 
27 That Suiza and Crowley supplied DeMoulas private label  is confirmed by Gillmeister and industry executives. 
28 Gillmeister and industry executives indicate that Star private label milk was supplied by Garelick/Suiza. 
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Garelick/Suiza (Mohl, 6/19/96; Macero, 10/18/97; Baily, 3/24/2000).  Ultimately in early 2000 
Suiza/Garelick raided Hood, hiring Hood’s Chief operating officer (second in command) and its 
head of marketing.  Ten days later Garelick fired the former claiming that Garelick staff refused 
to work under him (Baily, 3/24/2000). 
In the next section, we estimate price elasticities for Hood, Garelick, and private label 
milk.  Price elevation was profitable for Garelick and private label, even with relatively large 
losses of Garelick and private label volume.  Hood actually benefits with increased volumes but 
ultimately finds it profitable to follow the others on price. 
The Guida-Seibert Milk Company, New Britain, CT markets its branded milk in 
supermarkets other than Stop & Shop in the Hartford/Springfield area.  Appendix Figure A3 
indicates that Guida did not participate in the focal point pricing scheme at Compact 
implementation in July 1997.  The retail price for Guida milk fluctuates but stays at 
approximately $2.45 gallon for three periods after Compact implementation.  This was the retail 
price for their milk in the six periods prior to the Compact.  In the fourth period after the 
Compact they capitulate and elevate price to over $2.60 per gallon.  Note that private label milk 
is a very strong leader of the high price regime.  It increases from $2.40 per gallon to $2.60 per 
gallon at Compact implementation and remains at that level until the September 1998 farm price 
spike when it accelerates up.  Garelick supplied most of this private label milk.29 
X. Estimation of Market and Brand Level Elasticities Documents that the Exercise of 
Market Power is a Source of Wider Margins and Higher Retail Prices in the Post 
Compact Period 
 
29 This is based on prior knowledge of the Connecticut industry and is confirmed by Gillmeister and industry 
executives. 
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In this section we use the IRI data to estimate market-wide all milk and market-wide 
brand level price elasticities. We use the results to document the exercise of market power and its 
impacts.  Market power can be exercised in the channel by either processors, retailers, or both 
(Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar, 2000; Cotterill, 2001).  Focusing on the Boston market, at the 
processor level when Hood is pricing, it works against the Hood retail demand curve.  When 
Suiza/Garelick is pricing, it works against the retail demand curve for Garelick and private label 
milk since it supplies virtually all of the private label in the Boston supermarket market except 
for Stop & Shop.  Since Stop & Shop also markets the Hood milk in its stores for all but the last 
four week period of the data set, the pricing game for Hood in other chains and Suiza/Garelick 
depends on Stop & Shop’s price moves.   
We conclude, based upon their leading positions, that Suiza and Stop & Shop are the key 
players in any market power game in Southern New England markets.  If leading retailers choose 
to elevate retail prices without the tacit cooperation of Suiza, the processor could supply lower 
cost milk to the fringe retail firms and defeat the leading retailers attempt to elevate price. But 
why would Suiza want to do that?  Suiza’s tacit cooperation increases its profits as well as those 
of leading retailers.  It also eliminates the double marginalization of two successive dominant 
firms in the channel (Spengler, 1950).  Emerging “strategic partnerships or strategic alliances” 
between Suiza, leading retailers, very recently other processors, and Dairy Farmers of America 
are eliminating and/or foreclosing processing capacity.30 Barring entry or expansion by fringe 
 
30 These are one and the same.  Cartensen (2000) has written on the questionable features of strategic alliances.  
Steiner (2001) has written on strategic partnerships as a vehicle for exercising market power.  Recently, Wessanen, a 
Dutch  dairy processor announced the sale of Crowley Foods, the operator of Weeks Dairy in New Hampshire, to a 
“strategic partnership” run by former top level Suiza executives headquartered in the same town and owned by 
Dairy Farmers of America, Suiza’s “strategic partner”. 
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processors, channel profits are improving.  Any efficiency gains in this new system are not being 
passed forward to consumers via lower prices.31 
Having examined prices in detail in earlier sections of this report, let us now examine 
how the quantity of milk sold through Supermarkets in the IRI markets has varied over time.  
Figure 11 is a bar chart for total Class I milk sales in New England and sales by supermarkets in 
each of the four IRI market areas.  It is limited to July 1997 through March 2000 by the 
availability of Class I sales data. The supermarket volume in our database accounted for an 
average 40 percent of Class I volume in New England during this period.  Note that volume by 
supermarkets in the four geographic markets trends down over the post-Compact period.  Total 
Class I volume in New England also seems to decrease over the period.  Appendix Table F4 
reports regression results that more carefully determine the trends in the All New England (ANE) 
fluid milk volume and the All New England supermarket milk volume series.  There is a highly 
significant (1% level) negative trend in the latter, and a weak negative trend in ANE fluid milk 
volume that is marginally significant (10% level).  The difference between the ANE fluid milk 
and supermarket milk volume series however, has a highly significant and positive trend over 
time.  Half of the volume lost by supermarkets has gone to other milk distribution channels.  The 
other half constitutes a decline in fluid milk consumption.  The rise in retail prices over the 
period has to be a primary cause of these volume shifts. 
Figure 12 plots the monthly quantity of Hood, Garelick, and private label milk sold in 
Boston over time.32 Prior to the implementation of the Compact, the market position of these 
three products was relatively stable, and the overall quantity of milk sold (the sum of the three 
 
31 An alternative scenario is control of the supermarket accounts by Suiza prevents large efficient scale entry by 
others so Suiza can take higher margins elsewhere.  Recently Suiza was the sole bidder on a state of Massachusetts 
contract and attempted to elevate price substantially over prior contracts (Healy, Harden).  The result was 
considerable public outcry about the "milk monopoly" in the Boston press. 
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plotted lines) was also relatively stable since at best there is a very slight negative time trend for 
each brand.  After the Compact there is a clear shift away from private label and Garelick milk.  
Hood gains some of these customers, but total milk sold through supermarkets in Boston drops 
during this period (Figure 11).  Table F3 in the Appendix gives market share data by brand, 
chain, and market area for the before and after Compact periods.  Garelick and private label lose 
share.  Hood gains share.  In summary these quantity movements and the previously discussed 
price increases of Garelick and private label prices relative to Hood prices are a classic example 
of the exercise of market power by the purveyors of Garelick and private label.  Prices increase 
and output is restricted. 
Now let us examine demand elasticities to see whether these prices and quantity trends 
increased profits.  Figure 13 is a scatterplot for the all milk quantity and all milk weighted 
average price variables for the Boston market.  The general slope of this data plot clearly 
suggests that it identifies a negatively sloped market demand curve, and in fact the estimated 
logarthmic line drawn in Figure 13, as we see in Table 5, provides a good statistical fit to the 
data.  Since there was significant auto-correlation, as measured by the Durban-Watson statistic, 
we also report GLS results that use the Cochrane-Orcutt method to correct it.33 The estimated 
own price elasticity for Boston is highly significant under both OLS and GLS methods, but we 
will discuss and use only the GLS result.34 An own price elasticity of -.642 is inelastic (between 
0 and –1.0).  This means that a 1% increase in the price of milk sold in Boston produces a .642% 
 
32 For similar charts for the other market areas see Figures A4, B4, and C8. 
33 This is true for all GLS regressions reported in this study. 
34 One could specify more detailed demand relationships that would include income and controls for seasonability.  
The GLS method, however, controls for seasonability because it is a major source of autocorrelation in the residuals 
and income did not vary much over this four-year period in Boston.  It probably increased slightly over the 1996 to 
2000 period.  Since milk is a normal good, we would expect it to increase demand thereby offsetting some of the 
impact of the price increases over time.  This suggests that actual own and cross price elasticities may be slightly 
more elastic than our reported elasticities.  Nonetheless, the total effect on a firm's ability to raise price during the 
period due to demand elasticity and rising incomes is accurately reflected by these estimates. 
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decline in the quantity sold.  The market level own price elasticities in Table 5 for Providence, 
Hartford and Northern New England  are also inelastic (-.787, -.712, and -.483 respectively) and 
statistically significant.  A volume weighted average of these elasticities indicates that the All 
New England own price elasticity for supermarkets is approximately  -.63. 
 A key question in our forensic exercise remains, was it profitable for marketing firms to 
raise price?  If one cannot demonstrate that retail price elevation increased profits, then it is not 
market power.  One can, in fact, use the market elasticity to show that jointly increasing price 
was profitable for marketing firms.  Moreover, one can use brand level elasticities to show that it 
was profitable to elevate private label and Garelick prices more than Hood prices.  First, we start 
with a market wide analysis for Boston.  Then we present the brand level analysis that ranks the 
profitability of price moves by brand. 
 To analyze the profitability of a price move, ideally one needs cost and operating profit 
data from each of the channel players.  We do not have it, but a Cornell study provides such data 
for a representative firm in New York City for 1995.  Table 6 reproduces that study's 
decomposition of the retail price into cost components.  Processor profit is 3% of the retail price.  
The retail gross margin is 19% of the retail price.  If one assumes that the percent breakdowns 
are applicable to Boston and further assumes, generously, that the competitive rate of return on 
milk sales at retail is equal to the more capital intensive processor's margin, i.e. 3% of the retail 
price, we can compute the before Compact dollar profit margins for the Boston market channel 
players since we know the before Compact retail price averaged $2.42/gallon. 
 Retailer's before Compact dollar profit margin = .03 ($2.42) = $.0726 
 Processors before Compact dollar profit margin = .03 ($2.42) = $.0726 
 Total channel dollar before Compact profit margin (m) = $.1452 
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With the channel dollar profit margin, m, one can estimate the before Compact channel 
profits B as follows: 
1)  B B Bm Q= 
where QB = quantity of milk sold in an average four week period, before Compact. 
Since the 18 cents price move at Compact implementation amounted to a 12 cents 
widening of the channel margin (6 cents went to farmers) the channel dollar profit margin after 
Compact implementation mA is: 
2) BA mm 83.11452./)12.1452(. =+=
The 18 cent price increase raised the before Compact average retail price $2.42/gal (7.43 
percent).  Given that the Boston market demand elasticity is -.642, the quantity sold decreases (-
.642 * 7.43) 4.78 percent.  Therefore the quantity sold after the Compact QA, is: 
3) BA QQ )0478.1( =
Thus the after compact channel profits are: 
4)  A B B Bm Q=  =183 1 0478 174. ( . ) .  
The 12 cents widening of the unit profit margin, even after accounting for its depressing effect 
on quantity sold, raised profits 74%.  If our initial estimates of the profit margins are too high, 
then this number is too low.  If costs other than milk increased to account for some of the 12 cent 
margin expansion, then this estimate is biased up.  However, any increase in costs was most 
likely progressive over the post compact period which means that this profit gain was at best 
eroded slowly from the date of Compact implementation.  We conclude that the observed market 
wide price elevation was very profitable. 
 Turning now to an analysis of demand for milk at the brand level, Figures 14, 15, and 16 
are data plots for the price and quantity of Garelick, private label, and Hood milk respectively, 
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sold in Boston.  The Garelick and private label data clearly suggest negatively sloped own-price 
demand curves and we have drawn in the logarithmic regression lines from results reported in 
Table 9 below.   
 The scatter plot for Hood does not suggest a typical demand relationship.  This is 
because, as we have explained and will see below in a statistical fashion, shifts in the price of 
Garelick and private label are extremely important to Hood’s quantity movement.  In fact, as 
shown in Figure 16 and Table 9, there is a significant negative relationship between Hood price 
and quantity when one controls for changes in these other prices. 
 Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics for these data. Table 8 is a correlation matrix 
for the variables in the data set.  It is very important to note that private label and Garelick prices 
are extremely correlated with r =.978.  Both also are virtually identical to the all market price 
with correlations of .995 and .99 respectively with the Boston price.  From the strategic 
perspective, this suggests formula pricing at wholesale of the Garelick brand off private label, 
e.g. 10 cents over private label price and an identical in-store markup over wholesale.  The lack 
of a perfect correlation between Garelick and private label is due to slight differences in store 
merchandising.   
 Hood and private label retail prices are only somewhat less correlated with an r = .949. 
As we observed in the prior section, Hood did not always follow the price lead of the other two.  
Nonetheless its strategic deviations over the period are relatively minor when compared to the 
total observed price moves in the February 1996 to July 2000 period.   
 Given the extremely high level of correlation between brand prices, one really cannot talk 
about the exercise of unilateral market power, i.e. the elevation of one brand’s price assuming 
that the other brand’s prices remain constant.  This is especially true for Garelick and private 
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label.  Since these prices move in tandem, one is observing followship rather than non-
followship demand curves (Cotterill, Franklin and Ma, 1996, p. 5).  Therefore, our estimated 
demand elasticities for Garelick and Private Label tend to measure fully coordinated pricing of 
the two products (Merger Guidelines).  This is not too surprising given that Suiza, or its 
predecessor Garelick, supplied both to nearly everyone in the Boston market, except Stop & 
Shop.35 
Table 9 reports the results of logarithmic regression of a brand’s quantity on its own price 
and the prices of competing brands.  The reduction in own and cross price elasticities indicates 
that the lagged error correction process captures some temporal price reaction by the players and 
re-enforces our argument that the GLS results include coordinated effects.  Since either 
competitor's price captures movement in the other, we dropped one competitor price in each 
demand model with little loss of R2. We discuss only the final specification models which are 
reported in columns 5, 9, and 14 of Table 9.  Each reported coefficient is an elasticity. 
 Hood is the most price elastic brand with an own price elasticity of -2.46.  It is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Hood is the only brand with a statistically 
significant cross price effect.  A one percent increase in the price of private label increases 
Hood's quantity sold 1.685 percent.  Since Garelick price is so highly correlated with private 
label price, part of Hoods increased volume in Figure 2 undoubtedly comes from Garelick. 
 Turning now to the exercise of market power by Garelick and private label; if the 
switching effect to Hood is strong enough, the loss of volume can be substantial.  The switching 
effect would prevent Garelick and private label managers from profitably elevating price without 
Hood’s tacit cooperation.  Although Hood did not fully cooperate in pricing, and its volume and 
 
35 Garelick's role as a private label supplier in New England since early 1996 is well known and confirmed by 
industry sources and Gillmeister.  
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share increased when Garelick and Private Label increased prices, we find that Hood's 
disciplining action was not enough to prevent the exercise of power by the purveyors of Garelick 
and private label milk.  The price increases that we observe in our trend analyses, in fact, are 
profitable for both Garelick and Private Label. 
 To see this, one examines the own price elasticities for Garelick, -1.8, and private label, -
.53.  Both are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  These elasticities are so low in 
absolute value that a price increase can easily generate a percent increase in the unit profit 
margin that outweighs the corresponding percent loss in volume.  For Garelick, a 10 percent 
price increase more than doubles its profit sales ratio (price cost margin) but only reduces output 
by 18.06 percent.  Consequently, total profits (price-cost margin times output) increases.   
 In this type of pricing environment Hood actually has little incentive to compete on price, 
even with its more elastic demand condition, because increases in the other brand prices shifts its 
demand curve out increasing demand for its products.  In this situation, Hood will maximize its 
own profits by partly following the price lead of Garelick and private label (Levy and Reitzes; 
Werden and Rozansky; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar).  
 
XI. In the Supermarket Channel in New England, Estimated Loss to Consumers Due to 
the Dairy Compact are 19 Million Dollars, and Consumer Losses Due to the 
Exercise of Market Power are 49.4 Million Dollars  
A critical question remains.  What is the magnitude of the economic loss to consumers 
that can be attributed to the Dairy Compact and to the margin widening behavior of firms in the 
market channel?  We will compute losses on a dollar and per gallon basis for consumers for each 
of the New England IRI markets:  Boston, Providence, Hartford/Springfield and Northern New 
England.   As the maps in Appendix G indicate, these market areas cover 90% of New England. 
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Since retail prices are not responsive to the farm price cycle in the before period, we 
maintain that use of a traditional farm price markup model (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Lass et 
al., 2000) to forecast retail prices “but for” the Compact is not appropriate.  Our analysis 
indicates that retail pricing prior to Compact implementation is best based on the average farm 
price in the before period, a risk premium for farm price volatility, and stable trend line growth 
in the retail price to cover increases in other costs and profits (Table 2, equation 8). 
To estimate the impact of the Compact and industry pricing conduct on consumers, we 
use a before-after model.  Rather than use the average retail price in the before period, we use a 
linear trend to estimate the retail price immediately prior to Compact implementation.  Since the 
retail price trend is up, using this estimated before-Compact implementation price rather that the 
lower average retail price for the before-Compact period increases the before-Compact price and 
farm-to-retail margin.  This reduces our estimate of damages due to the exercise of market 
power.   
 Our estimate of the before-Compact price is forecast into the after-Compact period as 
follows.  We adjust it upward for the 6 cent per gallon Compact increase and increases in 
marketing input prices (labor, electricity, and gasoline).  The model’s after-Compact forecast 
prices are also adjusted up for permissible pass though of the farm price spikes when the Class I 
price moved, for short periods, above the Compact price.  We then subtract this forecast price 
from the actual price in each period to get a loss per gallon.  This is multiplied by the gallons 
sold to obtain each period’s dollar loss.  These losses are then summed over periods to obtain the 
total dollar loss which also is divided by total gallons sold to furnish the average loss per gallon.   
 This method overstates the impact of the Compact on consumers and understates its 
impact on channel profits because it ignores the Compact's risk reduction benefits for market 
53
channel firms.  Such benefits imply that channel firms did not need to pass forward the full 6 
cent raw milk average price increase to preserve their profit margins.   
 Starting with the Boston market, Figure 17 illustrates our consumer loss method in detail.  
The predicted retail price is virtually identical to the actual price in June 1997.  However, this 
need not always be true and the trend line gives a more stable estimate of the underlying "before" 
price.36 At implementation the Compact increased the farm price from the before Compact 
average $1.40 gallon to $1.46/gallon and effectively eliminates input price risk.  In theory retail 
price in the after Compact period should increase less than 6 cents per gallon because of reduced 
risk.  However, in our damages model we allow firms to pass forward the full 6 cent increase. 
Next, one must forecast how price needs to change in the after Compact period to cover 
increases in the costs of the other marketing inputs listed in Table 6.  We do not have data from 
the companies on their processing and marketing costs; however, Table 10 gives secondary 
source estimates for key cost components.  The growth in the dairy manufacturing wage rate for 
the total U.S. is a proxy for the growth in wage rates in the New England dairy processing and 
retail sector.  The growth in wages never exceeds 4% on an annual basis and averages 3% for 
1997 through 1999 the years most congruent with our July 1997 to July 2000 damages period.  
Prices for plastic bottles, again for the total U.S., remained stable in 1997, decrease in 1998 
increase in 1999.  The average growth in plastic costs for the 3 years is 1 percent.  Electricity for 
industrial purposes in Massachusetts increased 19.3 percent in 1997 but drops 7.1 and 18.6 
percent in 1998 and 1999.  The average growth rate for the entire period is negative 2 percent.  
Motor fuel for the U.S. dropped in price in 1997 and 1998 before advancing in 1999.  The three-
year average growth rate is 3.6%.   
 
36 The General Accounting Office has used a similar trend line approach to forecast price (GAO, 1998, p.35). 
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For comparison in Table 10, the Boston Producer Price Index average annual growth rate 
is 1.85% for the three-year period (July 1997 through June 2000).  The CPI (Boston Area) 
average annual growth rate for the same period is 2.4%.  Based on these growth rates, we 
conclude that a 3 percent growth factor for other inputs is the most appropriate adjustment to the 
farm-to-retail margin to cover increases in other costs.  Since higher cost growth factors lower 
damage estimates, to explore the sensitivity of our estimates, we will also compute consumer 
losses for 4 and 5 percent growth rates in costs other than milk. 
A three percent growth rate in the marketing margin to cover costs other than raw milk 
requires a smaller growth rate in retail prices.  To find that rate we compute the average farm-to-
retail margin in the before period, find the dollar value of a 3 percent increase in that margin and 
express it as a percent of the average retail price in the before Compact period.  For the Boston 
market the average margin is $0.98 (Table 1a).  Three percent of it, expressed as a percent of the 
average retail price, $2.38/gallon, is 1.24 percent.  This is the annual growth rate for price needed 
to generate a 3% growth in margin.  Returning to Figure 17, the forecast price line from July 
1997 forward increases at a 1.24 percent rate annually.37 
One major adjustment to our forecast prices remains.  Note in Figure 17 that farm milk 
prices spike up above the Compact minimum twice in the after period.  We will allow marketing 
firms to pass forward all of these milk cost increases to consumers.  This means that the 
consumer loss in dollars is the difference in any time period between the actual retail price and 
the forecast retail price times the number of gallons sold, but the difference between the farm 
price and the Compact minimum price for any period where farm price is above the Compact 
 
37 One reviewer asked why we did not use the retail price trend line to forecast retail prices in the after-Compact 
period.  The increase in retail prices during the before-Compact period represents some mixture of increases in non 
milk costs and increases in net profit margin.  As such, it is not an accurate forecast of price increases needed to 
cover costs. 
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minimum times the number of gallons sold is also subtracted from the loss estimate as a 
legitimate cost. 
Before discussing the actual dollar amount lost by consumers, note in Figure 17 that the 
channel firm's market power premium during the flat farm price period (July 1997 to August 
1998) slowly erodes to zero.  The actual retail price and the forecast price are effectively equal in 
August 1998.  Retail prices erode and costs increase to eliminate the premium.  Hood, Shaws and 
DeMoulas pricing behavior play a key role in this erosion.  A similar erosion of the premium 
occurs in Providence (Figure B1), Northern New England (Figure C1) and Hartford (Figure A1).  
In Providence, the erosion is clearly not due to Stop & Shop.  It is due to price-cutting by all 
other chains (Figure B2) and is due to price-cutting by Hood, not Suiza/Garelick or Suiza 
provided private label milk (Figure B3). 
Returning now to the Boston market area supermarkets, Table 11 gives the consumer loss 
estimates due to the exercise of market power. Different margin growth rates (to cover non-milk 
processing and marketing costs) produce different estimates.  Focusing on our best estimate, the 
3% case, dollar damages at supermarkets for the Boston market in the post Compact flat farm 
price period, July 97 through August 98, total 3.58 million dollars and are, on average, 5.4 cents 
per gallon for this period.  In the second part of the damages period, September 1998 through 
July 2000, total damages escalate to $19.33 million dollars and average 18.4 cents per gallon.  
Over the entire period dollar damages total $22.91 million and are 13.3 cents per gallon.   
This is our best estimate of consumer loss due to the exercise of market power by the 
marketing channel firms in the Boston market.  Note that the Compact increased the retail price 6 
cents per gallon during 30 of the 40 post-Compact periods when the Compact minimum price 
was effective.  Over the 40 periods, this averages to a 4.5 cent per gallon increase.  The 
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marketing firms, in response to this farm price change and the two subsequent market-generated 
cyclical farm price spikes, increased the retail price another 13.3 cents per gallon.  This 13.3 cent 
per gallon increase is above and beyond the price increases necessary to cover all cost increases 
including raw milk price increases due to the Compact or short supply. It is in excess of the price 
increase needed to protect and sustain the level of profitability that market channel firms enjoyed 
in the before-Compact period.  Therefore, it added $22.91 million to marketing firms' operating 
profits.  The 4% and 5%, margin growth rate results indicate that allowing for higher rates, 
ostensibly to cover growth in costs other than milk, does lower the loss estimate.  However even 
at an unrealistic, high 5% growth rate, total dollar damages are $17.19 million and 10 cents per 
gallon. 
We turn now to the ultimate questions.  First, how much did New England consumers 
lose to farmers when the Compact elevated price 6 cents per gallon in 30 of the 40 after-Compact 
periods and stabilized price during the after compact period but for the two farm price spike 
episodes?  Second, how much did New England consumers lose due to the exercise of market 
power by channel firms at Compact implementation and after the two farm price spikes?   
We will answer these questions in reverse order.  Table 12 gives consumer loss estimates 
for each of the four New England IRI market areas and for all of New England.  It also 
decomposes the loss estimates for the farm price peg period (7/97-8/98) and the subsequent 
period (9/19/98-7/20/00) with the two firm price spikes.  Focusing on consumer loss for the total 
period (approximately 3 years), consumers in New England paid 49.4 million dollars more for 
supermarket milk than they would have if no market power had been exercised.  This amounts to 
an average overcharge of 13 cents per gallon.  These losses continue to accrue after July 2000 
and will do so until channel profit margins narrow to pre-Compact levels. 
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Turning now to the first question, consumer loss due to the implementation of the 
Compact, the computation is straightforward in our loss model.  The Compact raised the price 6 
cents per gallon over the before period average price in 30 after-Compact periods and it reduced 
price variation in the major input, raw milk.  Economic theory predicts unambiguously that risk 
reduction is worth something because firms are generally risk averse.  However, we will not 
reduce the cost increase for any such risk reduction because we have not estimated the channel's 
risk premium and its relation to variation in raw milk prices.38 We assume that the 6 cent per 
gallon industry wide cost increase is fully passed on to consumers.  Finally as we did for our 
estimate of monopoly overcharges, here we also remove the 10 farm price spike periods.  When 
farm prices were above the $1.46 gallon Compact price, those prices were not due to the 
Compact.  Therefore, in those periods, the Compact had no impact on consumers. 
Table 13 gives the impact of the Compact on consumers.  The total consumer loss for all 
of New England due to the Compact’s slight elevation of price, 4.3 percent over average price in 
the before Compact period is 19 million dollars. This amount palls in comparison to the 49.4 
million dollar loss due to the exercise of market power at Compact implementation and after the 
price spikes.   
The total consumer loss for the three year period was 68.4 million dollars.  Fully 72 
percent of consumer loss is due to the exercise of market power by firms in the marketing 
channel, most notably the New England dairy industry leaders Stop & Shop and Hannaford at 
retail and Suiza/Garelick at the processor level.  Other firms at both stages, however, tended to 
follow their lead. 
Recall that this study focuses on only major brand and private label sales in 
supermarkets.  These sales account for only 40 percent of all fluid milk sold in New England 
 
38 In principle this could be done. 
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(Figure 11).  If one assumes that supermarkets set a price umbrella or benchmark price for other 
fluid milk channels, then losses due to the Compact and the exercise of market power in those 
channels would be similar and in proportion to their share of all fluid milk sales. 
Our results clearly document that the leading retailers and processors did more than 
oppose the Compact in the political arena.  They have used their power in markets to elevate 
prices.  They also have attributed higher retail market prices to farmers and the Compact 
program (Massachusetts Department of Agriculture). 
 
XII.  The Dairy Compact Increased Farm Income 128.5 Million Dollars; but only 51.5 
million came from the Supermarket Channel and of that only 19 Million Dollars 
came from Consumers with the rest Coming from the Compact’s Price Support 
Feature. 
 
Elsewhere the Dairy Compact Commission and others have correctly computed that the 
Compact has generated over 120 million dollars in increased revenue for New England dairy 
farmers prior to July 2000.  We estimate that the Compact increased dairy farm income 128 
million dollars in the July 1997 to July 2000 period.  The corresponding number for the 
supermarket distribution channel, which sells approximately 40 percent of all fluid milk, is 51.5 
million dollars.  If supermarket consumers paid only 19 million dollars more due to Compact-
induced higher farm prices that channel firms passed forward, where does the rest come from?  It 
comes from drops in the class I price below the Compact price that New England farmers 
avoided because of the Compact. These raw milk price decreases would not have been passed on 
to supermarket consumers if there had been no Compact.  Recall that there is no relationship 
between farm and supermarket retail prices in the before Compact period.  
SIDE BOX: Different Benchmarks Give Different Impacts 
Impact analysis can be confusing unless one understands that there are two benchmarks.  
One can measure the change in the level of a target variable such as the farm raw milk price over 
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time, i.e. before and after a stimulus such as Compact implementation.  Alternatively, one can 
measure what the level of the target variable would have been during the after period if there had 
been no stimulus.   Consider the Dairy Compact implementation in July 1997.  In the 18 weeks 
before the Compact, the raw fluid milk price, i.e. the farm price, averaged $1.40 per gallon.  In the 
15 weeks after the compact, it was constant at $1.46 per gallon.  The price that farmers received 
increased 6 cents per gallon.  One can also ask how much did the Compact increase farm price over 
what farmers would have received if there had been no Compact.  This differential is the Compact 
premium, i.e. the difference between the compact price and the Class I fluid milk price.  In the 15 
weeks after the Compact, the average difference was 13 cents per gallon ($1.46-$1.33).  The 
counterfactual results is 7 cents higher than the before-after result because the class I price 
dropped 7 cents.  Both the before-after and counter factual approaches provide a valid measure of 
the impact of the Compact on farmers. 
One continues to have two alternative benchmarks when examining the impact of the 
Compact on retail price; however, the analysis is necessarily more complicated.  Since the Compact 
directly impacts the farm price, one needs an economic model to identify the linkage between farm 
and retail prices.  We demonstrate that the appropriate theoretical and empirical model is on that 
recognizes input price risk and controls for the exercise of market power and changes in non-milk 
marketing input costs.  Our model identifies how retail price changed over time due to the Compact 
and these other factors.  This is the correct benchmark for consumer analysis when the question is 
how much did the Compact increase prices over what consumers previously paid.  The 
counterfactual question is how much would consumer prices drop “if there were no Compact.”  For 
some issues, this too is a valid question. 
What would have happened if the supermarket market channel firms had not exercised 
market power against consumers?  In the after Compact period, their profit margin would have 
been the same as in the before Compact period except for the added profits due to risk reduction.  
Price increases at retail would have covered only increases in raw milk costs and other input 
costs. Supermarket consumers would have lost only 19 million dollars and farmers would 
continue to receive 51.5 dollars in added income from the supermarket channel. This analysis 
ignores expanded demand due to lower retail prices. Demand expansion would increase both of 
these estimates slightly. 
 To summarize, if market channel firms do not exercise market power, farmers continue to 
benefit from the Compact’s price floor provision and the modest transfer from consumers.  The 
transfer is 6 cents per gallon when farm price is at the Compact minimum (1.46).  Processors and 
retailers keep the same profit level as before the Compact plus profits from risk reduction.  With 
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a modicum of margin reduction by processors and retailers to reflect the benefits of input-price 
risk reduction, consumer loss would be lower than 19 million in total or 6 cents per gallon. 
 The impacts that this study reports, except for the exercise of market power by processors 
and retailers, are consistent with the rationale for the Northeast Dairy Compact.  The exercise of 
market power in the marketing channel has distorted actual market performance to the benefit of 
processors and retailers at an expense to consumers that is far greater than the impact of the 
Compact on consumers.  This suggests that the major policy issue now facing New England 
consumers of fluid milk is not the Northeast Dairy Compact.  It is the exercise of market power 
by the region's leading retailers and milk processor.  There seems to be a clear and important role 
for the Northeast Dairy Compact Commission.  There is a need to monitor the price and margin 
performance of the New England milk industry.  There is a need to ensure that competition is 
effective, and that consumer milk prices accurately reflect the cost of producing, processing, and 
distributing milk.  The Commission’s work could contribute to future antitrust enforcement or 
eliminate the need for enforcement if firms respond competitively to public scrutiny.  To date, 
they have responded in an anticompetitive fashion to public intervention. 
 
XIII. Decomposing Retail Prices into Payments for Factors of Production and Profits 
Documents  
How Meager the Compact’s Contribution to Higher Prices is in Comparison to the 
Increase in Profit by Channel Firms. 
 
Who gained from the retail milk price hikes that occurred at Compact implementation and 
subsequently through July 2000?  The factors of production are raw milk and non-milk 
marketing inputs.  Table 14 gives the breakdown between these factors and profits for all New 
England, and for the four component markets–Boston, Providence, Hartford, Northern New 
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England. We will discuss in detail only the all New England results. All statistics are on a per 
gallon basis. 
Note in Table 14 that the average farm price in the Before-Compact period was $1.40.  In 
the After-Compact period the average farm price increased 11 cents to $1.51.  This increase can 
be decomposed into the increase due to the Compact’s price floor at $1.46 and the increase due 
to the price spikes above Compact.  Since the Compact minimum was not in effect during the 
spike periods the per gallon impact of the Compact averaged across all milk sold in the After-
Compact period is less than 6 cents/gallon.  On average during the After-Compact period 
consumers paid only 4.5 cents per gallon more due to the Compact.  The price spikes above 
Compact contributed the remainder of the 11 cents increase in the farm price (6.5 cents).  Our 
best estimate of the increase in non-milk costs is a 3 percent annual growth rate in the before-
Compact marketing margin.  This growth adds 7 cents to the retail price.  The total cost increase 
is the sum of the farm price increase and the increase in other costs.  It is 18 cents. 
Our forecast retail price prior to Compact implementation for all milk in all New England 
is $2.49.  The retail price in the After-Compact period averages $2.78.  Retail price increased 29 
cents.  Subtracting the total cost increase from the price increase gives the increase in profits 
that channel firms captured with their power pricing game.  For all supermarkets in all New 
England it is 11 cents. 
In conclusion, increased channel profits contributed as much to retail price increases as 
did the combination of the Compact program and the sporadic strong raw milk market.  The 
Compact by itself had a meager impact on retail prices when compared to other causes of retail 
price increase.  Its 4.5 cent contribution is only 15.5 percent of the 29 cent increase in retail 
prices, and it constitutes only a 1.8 percent increase in the before-Compact retail price. 
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XIV. The Exercise of Market Power by Channel Firms Shifts the Industry to a more 
Elastic Region of the Fluid Milk Market Demand Curve Thereby Reducing the 
Effectiveness of the Federal Milk Market Order System and Compacts. 
 
The need for effective competition is even more critical in the fluid milk industry than 
other food industries.  Increasing concentration and the exercise of market power in the channel 
by processors and retailers is a direct attack on the classified pricing system of the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order system and the Northeast Dairy Compact.  Classified pricing sets a price for 
milk sold to processors of fluid milk (the inelastic product) that is higher than the price for milk 
used in manufacturing (elastic products).  Since the 1930’s, the U.S. Congress and state 
legislatures have used or authorized the use of classified pricing to stabilize and increase dairy 
farm income.  In an effectively competitive milk marketing channel, the inelastic fluid market 
demand curve can only be exploited by government in a fashion that is deemed in the public 
interest.   
 A fundamental law in economics is: profit maximizing firms will elevate price until 
quantity purchased is reduced to the level where demand for the product becomes elastic.  Now 
with the increase in concentration and dominance in many local processing and food retailing 
markets, private firms are capturing the ability to price off the market demand curve.  As milk 
channel firms exercise market power to elevate prices and profits, inelastic demand becomes 
more elastic. As a result, the ability of public agencies to increase dairy farm income via 
classified pricing is reduced.  If milk prices are elevated to the level where farm level market 
demand is elastic, then public classified pricing programs are completely ineffective.  An 
increase in farm price no longer increases farm revenue.  It reduces farm revenue. Is this the 
future path of the U.S. dairy industry?  If so, it does not bode well for farmers or consumers. 
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Table 1a.  Farm Price and Farm to Retail Milk Marketing Margins for Fluid 
Milk: Before and After the Northeast Dairy Compact, Boston ($/Gallon) 
 mean St. Dev 
Farm Price Pre $1.40 0.102 
 Post $1.46 0.000 
 Change +.06  
 
Margin by Brand 
 
All Boston Milk Pre $0.98 0.109 
 Post $1.10 0.021 
 Change +.12  
Hood Pre $1.40 0.124 
 Post $1.42 0.069 
 Change +.02  
Garelick/Suiza Pre $1.12 0.107 
 Post $1.21 0.046 
 Change +.09  
Private Label Pre $0.87 0.113 
 Post $1.00 0.019 
 Change +.13  
 
Margin for Leading Retailers 
 
Stop & Shop Pre $1.01 0.123 
 Post $1.16 0.014 
 Change +.15  
Shaws Pre $1.01 0.121 
 Post $1.10 0.038 
 Change +.09  
Star Pre $1.12 0.112 
 Post $1.27 0.024 
 Change +.15  
Demoulas Pre $0.80 0.112 
 Post $0.92 0.035 
 Change +.12  
Source: Calculated from Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database, Federal Marketing Order 
One. 
Pre NEDC = 18 obs., February 1996 through June 1997; Post NEDC = 15 obs., July 1997 
through August 1998. 
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Table 1b.  Farm to Retail Milk Marketing Margins for Fluid Milk: Before and After the New England  
Dairy Compact; Hartford, Providence, Northern New England, and All New England. 
 Hartford Providence N New England All New England
Margin by Brand Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev 
All Milk Pre $1.14 0.112 $1.06 0.128 $0.99 0.136 $1.03 0.119 
Post $1.30 0.022 $1.20 0.027 $1.15 0.037 1.17 0.019 
 Change +.16  +.14  +.16  +.14  
Hood Pre $1.37 0.108 $1.45 0.138 $1.30 0.168 $1.38 0.119 
 Post $1.48 0.046 $1.47 0.074 $1.38 0.056 $1.43 0.043 
 Change +.11  +.02  +.08  +.05  
Garelick/Suiza Pre $1.20 0.182 $1.22 0.127 $1.24 0.134 $1.15 0.117 
 Post $1.42 0.089 $1.33 0.046 $1.25 0.085 $1.26 0.047 
 Change +.22  +.11  +.01  +.11  
Guida Pre $1.09 0.123     $1.09 0.123 
 Post $1.21 0.182     $1.21 0.128 
 Change +.12      +.12  
Sealtest Pre $1.65 0.141     $1.65 0.141 
 Post $1.82 0.067     $1.82 0.067 
 Change +.17      +.17  
Booth Pre     $1.60 0.160 $1.60 0.160 
 Post     $1.76 0.062 $1.76 0.062 
 Change +.16  +.16  
Oakhurst Pre     $1.46 0.185 $1.46 0.185 
 Post     $1.64 0.040 $1.64 0.040 
 Change +.18  +.18  
Weeks Pre     $1.01 0.123 $1.01 0.123 
 Post     $1.28 0.059 $1.28 0.059 
 Change +.27  +.27  
Private Label Pre $1.05 0.116 $0.93 0.134 $0.87 0.130 $0.92 0.120 
 Post $1.20 0.016 $1.07 0.028 $1.01 0.046 $1.05 0.023 
 Change +.15  +.14  +.14  +.13  
 
Margin for Leading Retailers 
 
Stop & Shop Pre $1.17 0.142 $1.04 0.151   $1.09 0.135 
 Post $1.38 0.012 $1.23 0.017   $1.26 0.013 
 Change +.21  +.19    +.17  
Shaws Pre     $0.95 0.123 $0.95 0.123 
 Post     $1.07 0.026 $1.07 0.026 
 Change +.12  +.12  
Shop N Save Pre     $1.08 0.158 $1.08 0.158 
 Post     $1.27 0.064 $1.27 0.064 
 Change +.19  +.19  
Source: Calculated from Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database, Federal Marketing Order 
One. 
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Pre NEDC = 18 obs., February 1996 through June 1997; Post NEDC = 15 obs., July 1997 
through August 1998. 
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Table 2. Time Series Models to Predict Retail Prices in the Before Compact Period: Boston.
1 month lagged 2 month lagged Boston Plastic Adj.
Eqn. Method Intercept Farm Price Farm Price Farm Price CPI wage electricity Fuel containers Date DW R2
1 OLS 2.413 -0.020 0.345 -0.058
(22.546)*** (-0.266)
2 GLS 2.304 0.057 0.602
(23.23)*** (0.805)
3 OLS 2.419 -0.144 0.181 -0.058 0.740 -0.111
(19.893)*** (-1.187) (0.974) (-0.444)
4 GLS 2.214 0.061 0.015 0.050 0.403
(13.63)*** (0.711) (0.149) (0.546)
5 OLS -0.161 0.016 1.196 0.711
(-0.414) (6.545)***
6 OLS 0.412 0.016 0.148 0.0001 -0.0006 0.001 1.823 0.795
(0.954) (0.250) (4.254)*** (0.011) (-0.499) (0.146)
7 OLS 2.336 0.005 1.236 0.742
(299.5)*** (7.054)***
8 GLS 2.338 0.005 0.745
(234.3)*** (5.328)***
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Number of Observations = 18.
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Table 3. Volume Sold to Supermarkets and Market Share by 
 Manufacturer, All New England, July 1999 through July 2000. 
million lbs share
Suiza (Garelick and PL) 652.99 44.8
Hood (Stop & Shop) 69.4 4.8
Hood (All Other) 222.6 15.3
Guida 96.02 6.6
Crowley 33.69 2.3
Oakhurst 108.79 7.5  
Stop & Shop (PL) 275.26 18.9*
* Effective June 1, 2000, Suiza began supplying Stop & Shop private label milk.  Suiza’s estimated share 
going forward in 2000 increases to 63.7%.  The Stop & Shop plant is closed. 
Source: Calculated from Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database.
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Table 4. IRI Market Area All Product Market Shares of Leading Supermarket Chains, 1996 and 2000. 
 
IRI Market Area  1996 2000 
 
Boston 
 Stop & Shop  26.2 28.4 
 Shaws  16.9 27.0 
 Demoulas  13.1 12.5 
 Roche Bros.  5.1 4.5 
 Star  3.5 
 
CR4 61.3 72.4 
Partial HHI  1169.7 1712.1 
 
Providence 
 Stop & Shop  46.8 47.3 
 Shaws  17.8 23.4 
 Edwards  8.7 - 
 RoJacks  2.8 8.7 
 Daves  - 3.2 
 
CR4 76.1 82.6 
Partial HHI  2590.6 2870.8 
 
Hartford/Springfield 
 Stop & Shop  40.4 41.8 
 Big Y  13.9 15.3 
 Shaws  7.7 7.5 
 A&P  11.7 6.9 
 
CR4 73.7 71.5 
Partial HHI  2021.6 2085.2 
 
Northern New England 
 Hannaford  36.6 36.7 
 Shaws  19.7 21.7 
 Demoulas  12.7 12.3 
 Grand Union  9.1 6.5 
 
CR4 78.1 77.2 
Partial HHI  1971.8 2011.3 
 
The Partial HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of the four leading firms presented in this table. 
Source: Calculated from Trade Dimensions Market Scope 1997 and 2000 Update, Interactive Market 
Systems, Wilton, CT. 
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Table 5. Estimated Demand Elasticities for Milk: Boston, Providence, Hartford, and Northern New England 

















Intercept 2.053 2.096 0.521 0.407 1.655 1.640 1.746 1.683 
t-statistic (34.7)*** (19.18)*** (6.462)*** (2.223)** (17.74)*** (8.466)*** (18.98)*** (9.691)*** 
 
Price -0.595 -0.642 -0.816 -0.712 -0.795 -0.787 -0.545 -0.483 
t-statistic (-9.696)*** (-5.680)*** (-10.20)*** (-3.949)*** (-8.818)*** (-4.208)*** (-5.688)*** (-2.678)** 
 
R2 0.620 0.750 0.644 0.869 0.574 0.826 0.355 0.713 
DW 0.795  0.403  0.500  0.486  
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
* Significant at 10% 
Number of Obs. = 58 
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Table 6. Cost Components of Milk Sold at Retail: New York City, 1995* 
 
$/gal Percent
Raw Milk 1.31 64.9 
Processing Costs 
 Plant Costs .24 11.9 
 Packaging .10 5.0 
 Selling .05 2.5 
 Administration .07 3.5 
 Profit .06 3.0
Total Processing .52 25.7 
Retailing Margin .19 9.4 
Retail Price 2.02 100.0 
 
Source: Erba. E.M., R.D. Aplin, M.W. Stephenson. 1997. 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics, Retail Milk Price and Quantity, March 1996 – July 2000. 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean St. Dev.
Price ($/gal.) 
All Boston 2.33 3.03 2.62 0.220 
 Hood  2.69 3.36 2.97 0.193 
 Garelick 2.46 3.29 2.78 0.263 
 Private Label 2.21 2.84 2.49 0.197 
 
All Hartford 2.46 3.23 2.81 0.229 
All Providence 2.37 3.20 2.74 0.262 
All N New England 2.30 2.99 2.61 0.193 
 
Quantity (Million Gals.) 
All Boston 3.70 4.90 4.40 0.268 
 Hood  .33 .76 .54 0.140 
 Garelick .81 1.52 1.14 0.183 
 Private Label 2.23 3.10 2.72 0.215 
 
All Hartford 1.93 2.65 2.31 0.194 
All Providence .59 .86 0.75 0.007 
All N New England 2.85 3.85 3.41 0.224 
 
Source: Calculated from the Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database. 
Number of observations = 58.
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Table 8. Correlations of Retail Prices and Quantities, March 1996 – July 2000. 
 
Boston Hartford ProvidenceN New England 
 Price Price Price Price 
 
Boston Price  1.000 
Hartford Price  0.983 1.000 
Providence Price  0.996 0.985 1.000 
N New England Price 0.963 0.954 0.960 1.000 
 
Boston Hood Garelick PL Boston Hood  Garelick PL 
 Price Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity 
 
Boston Price 1.000 
 
Hood Price 0.960 1.000 
 
Garelick Price 0.990 0.963 1.000 
 
PL Price 0.995 0.949 0.978 1.000 
 
Boston Quantity -0.805 -0.771 -0.798 -0.778 1.000 
 
Hood Quantity 0.821 0.660 0.778 0.818 -0.611 1.000 
 
Garelick Quantity -0.890 -0.813 -0.892 -0.886 0.901 -0.798 1.000 
 
PL Quantity -0.773 -0.658 -0.746 -0.750 0.874 -0.808 0.795 1.000 
 
Source: Calculated from the Food Marketing Policy Center IRI database. 
All Correlations are significant at the 99% level. 
Number of observations = 58. 
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Table 9. Estimated Demand Elasticities for Hood, Garelick, and Private Label: Boston





























Intercept -0.811 -0.649 -1.281 0.658 0.489 1.255 1.243 1.639 1.639 1.313 1.294 1.461 1.398 1.447
t-statistic (-2.108)** (-1.361) (-3.755)*** (1.260) (0.956) (5.816)*** (5.799)*** (6.479)*** (6.543)*** (7.775)*** (7.615)*** (6.884)*** (6.428)*** (6.839)***
Hood Price -6.240 -5.756 -5.212 -2.442 -2.461 1.255 1.219 0.296 0.294 0.928 0.873 0.003 -0.090 0.025
t-statistic (-7.392)*** (-5.519)*** (-6.955)*** (-5.430)*** (-5.346)*** (2.651)** (2.598)** (0.634) (0.681) (2.506)** (2.348)** (0.116) (-0.395) (0.100)
Garelick Price 2.151 6.119 -0.0.916 -2.098 -2.398 -1.803 -1.806 -0.770 -1.220 -0.009 -0.302
t-statistic (2.338)** (8.498)*** (-1.821)* (-4.066)*** (-7.406)*** (-3.526)*** (-5.765)*** (-1.908)* (-4.749)*** (-0.303) (-1.547)
PL Price 5.195 6.892 2.509 1.685 -0.393 -0.005 -0.589 -0.454 -.528
t-statistic (5.555)*** (11.249)*** (3.607)*** (3.188)*** (-0.749) (-0.007) (-1.434) (-1.189) (-2.026)*
Adj. R2 0.827 0.732 0.812 0.953 0.951 0.841 0.842 0.878 0.881 0.595 0.587 0.836 0.835 0.839
DW 1.086 1.038 0.741 1.108 1.101 0.601 0.641
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
Number of Observations = 58.
Table 10. Annual Percent Change in Dairy Marketing Inputs, the Boston 
Producer Price Index, and the US Consumer Price Index. 
 1997-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
Dairy 
Manufacturing 
Wage 3.3 2.2 3.9 2.8 3.0% 
Plastic Bottles 1.3 0.1 -2.3 5.1 1.0% 
Industrial Electric -1.2 19.3 -7.1 -18.6 -2.0% 
Motor Fuel 9.2 -6.9 -12.8 30.5 3.6% 
Boston Producer 
Price Index -0.9 -1.6 0.6 6.5 1.85% 
U.S. Consumer  
Price Index 2.2 1.7 2.1 3.5 2.4% 
 
Source: Calculated from, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept. of Energy and 
WEFA Group Inc. Econbase 
data.    
 
Table 11. Boston Market Level Estimates of Consumer Loss and Loss per Gallon Due to Market 
Power at Different Margin Growth Rates, July 1997- July 2000. 
Post Compact Flat  Farm Price 
 Farm Price Period Spike Period Total Period 
 Margin Price  July 1997- September 1998- July 1997- 
Growth Rate Growth Rate Units  August 1998 July 2000 July 2000 
 
3.0% 1.24% Million $  3.58 19.33 22.91 
 $/gal 0.054 0.184 0.133 
 
4.0% 1.65% Million $ 3.19 16.88 20.06 
 $/gal 0.048 0.161 0.117 
 
5.0% 2.06% Million $ 2.79 14.40 17.19 
 $/gal 0.042 0.137 0.100 
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Table 12. Consumer Loss Due to the Exercise of Market Power since the Advent of the Northeast Dairy 
Compact by Market Channel Firms, July 1997 – July 2000. 
Table 13. Consumer Loss Due to the Implementation of the  





(millions) Loss per Gallon 
Growth Rate for Period 1 Period 2  Period 1 Period 2  
3% Cost Adj. 7/97-8/98 9/98-7/00 Sum 7/97-8/98 9/98-7/00 Sum 
 
Boston 1.24 3.58 19.33 22.91 0.05 0.18 0.13 
Hartford  1.35 2.71 10.85 13.56 0.07 0.20 0.15 
Providence  1.29 0.41 3.78 4.20 0.04 0.22 0.15 
Northern New England  1.24 2.63 6.14 8.77 0.05 0.08 0.07 
 Total (All New England) 9.33 40.10 49.43 0.05 0.16 0.11 
Million
Dollars
Boston 7.7  
Hartford  4.1  
Providence  1.3  
Northern New England  5.9  
 Total (All New England) 19.0  
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Table 14.  Who Gained from the Retail Milk Price Hikes: July 1997 to July 2000 
 Before the After the Change 
Compact Compact per gallon 
All New England      
1 Average Farm Price  $1.40 $1.51 0.11
Increase due to Compact    0.045 
 Increase due to Strong Raw Milk Market 0.065 
2 Increase due to non Milk inputs   0.07
3 Total Cost Increase (1+2)    0.18
4 Retail Price   $2.49 $2.78 0.29
Increase in Profits (4-3)    0.11
Boston       
1 Average Farm Price  $1.40 $1.51 0.11
Increase due to Compact    0.045 
 Increase due to Strong Raw Milk Market 0.065 
2 Increase due to non Milk inputs   0.06
3 Total Cost Increase (1+2)    0.17
4 Retail Price   $2.43 $2.73 0.30
Increase in Profits (4-3)    0.13
Hartford-Springfield      
1 Average Farm Price  $1.40 $1.51 0.11
Increase due to Compact    0.045 
 Increase due to Strong Raw Milk Market 0.065 
2 Increase due to non Milk inputs   0.08
3 Total Cost Increase (1+2)    0.19
4 Retail Price   $2.60 $2.94 0.34
Increase in Profits (4-3)    0.15
Providence      
1 Average Farm Price  $1.40 $1.51 0.11
Increase due to Compact    0.045 
 Increase due to Strong Raw Milk Market 0.065 
2 Increase due to non Milk inputs   0.07
3 Total Cost Increase (1+2)    0.18
4 Retail Price   $2.54 $2.87 0.33
Increase in Profits (4-3)    0.15
Northern New England     
1 Average Farm Price  $1.40 $1.51 0.11
Increase due to Compact    0.045 
 Increase due to Strong Raw Milk Market 0.065 
2 Increase due to non Milk inputs   0.06
3 Total Cost Increase (1+2)    0.17
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4 Retail Price   $2.47 $2.71 0.24
Increase in Profits (4-3)       0.07
